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Public Risk Perceptions Toward Socially Contentious Technology: How Cultural Values and 
Basic Knowledge Affect Nuclear Energy Risk Assessments 
We cannot know with certainty the risks we must face, but we must act as if we do. To that end, 
experts are well equipped and trained to formulate risk assessments consistent with scientific evidence. 
But in the case of nuclear energy, most Canadians view the technology as dangerous despite expert 
assurances of safety. Nuclear energy policy must therefore square a contradiction whereby nuclear 
technology is accepted by most experts as safe yet perceived by most Canadians as dangerous.  
This thesis explores the contradiction by asking why some members of the public refuse to accept the 
opinion of experts that nuclear technology is low-risk. One explanation asserts that, unlike experts, 
members of the public have poor science comprehension and are prone to perceiving risk in ways 
marred by cognitive bias. An alternative explanation contends that preexisting worldviews motivate 
members of the public to perceive risk in ways that do not necessarily align with the goal of accurate 
risk estimates. To understand why members of the public sometimes amplify nuclear energy risk, these 
two competing explanations were turned into testable hypotheses and empirically tested among 575 
Canadians.  
The present study found evidence which suggests those who strongly agree with egalitarians values are 
likely to hold amplified nuclear energy risk perceptions, and those who have greater knowledge of 
basic facts about nuclear energy tend to have reduced risk perceptions towards nuclear energy. Such 
results affirm the idea that education is an effective policy tool for reducing nuclear energy fears. 
However, egalitarian values may interfere with educational efforts to transmit facts, which is why 
educational efforts can prove more effective if nuclear energy facts are framed in a way that appeals to 
egalitarian values. 
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CHAPTER I.  
INTRODUCTION 
Ordinary citizens are poor evaluators of technological risk. This phenomenon occurs because, unlike 
experts, most citizens lack the formal training, time, and motivation necessary to accurately assess risk. 
The inability to accurately estimate technological risk is also typically unproblematic because, rather 
than rigorously investigating risks for themselves, most citizens adopt risk attitudes consistent with 
expert precautions (Kahan et al., 2015). As a result, risk precautions from experts are largely 
uncontested by the public. Hazards from vehicle mechanical errors, side effects from medications, 
advisories to not drink untreated water, labels denoting expired food, and a whole gamut of risk 
precautions illustrate the fact that how the public perceive risk is largely a function of expert 
prescriptions.  
There are, however, a few exceptions in which public risk ignorance is problematic. 
Technologies such as vaccines, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and nuclear power are 
notorious for sparking heated public debate about their potential risks posed to human health, the 
environment, or the economy. Moreover, in these particular cases public risk attitudes do not reflect 
expert opinion. Meta analyses show that fears of vaccines causing autism (Taylor, Swerdfeger, & 
Eslick, 2014), of GMOs causing chronic illness (Nicolia, Manzo, Veronesi, & Rosellini, 2014), or of 
nuclear power causing cancer (Kim, Bang, & Lee, 2016) are unsubstantiated by available scientific 
evidence. In other words, despite the availability of facts, cases exist in which significant numbers of 
the public ignore or strongly disagree with experts. As a result, skeptical citizens perceive high risk in 
technologies developed to protect against existential threats such as diseases, food insecurity, and climate 
change. Why? 
As political scientist Aaron Wildavsky outlines, it is puzzling why some members of the public 
mistake low-risk technologies as high-risk: 
How extraordinary! The richest, longest-lived, best-protected, most resourceful civilization, with the 
highest degree of insight into its own technology, is on its way to becoming the most frightened. [...] 
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Even today there are risks from numerous small dams far exceeding those from nuclear reactors. Why 
is the one feared and not the other? Is it just that we are used to the old or are some of us looking differently 
at essentially the same sorts of experience?  (1978, p. 32)1 
Fear is one factor causing some individuals to mistake low-risk technology as high risk. In its simplest 
form, fear is a strong unpleasant emotional response driven by the belief that there is danger to be 
avoided (Merriam-Webster, 2016). But fear operates as a general purpose response mechanism, not as 
a response corresponding directly with the presence of danger. For instance, a rustling in the bushes 
will grab our attention whether caused by the wind, a small animal, or a predator. Fear can be 
imprecise. Together, its imprecision and compelling nature becomes problematic when an individual 
fears something which poses little danger. Phobias of ants (myrmecophobia), books (bibliophobia), or 
colours (chromophobia) illustrate cases in which we clearly recognize in others that their fear response 
is mistaken. To be sure, phobias are instances of abnormal psychology. But they nonetheless 
demonstrate how fear, a strong emotional response, can subsume rational thought when identifying 
danger. Similarly, if individuals fear a technology which experts and evidence indicate as safe, it may be 
fair to observe that fear is causing some individuals to mistake low-risk technology as high-risk.  
One theoretical explanation for why citizens mistake technological risk is because they are 
irrational assessors of it. Experts rigorously assess risk by measuring hazards in accordance with the 
evidence and undergo training designed to ameliorate bias when interpreting such evidence; ordinary 
citizens do not (Marx et al., 2007; Weber, 2006; Sunstein, 2005, 2007, as cited in Kahan, 2015). 
Citizens, on the other hand, tend to assess risk by relying upon intuition and emotions including fear. 
And so, when trusting their own judgments independent from the norms of scientific inquiry, ordinary 
citizens are susceptible to formulating irrational risk assessments riddled with bias. 
A second question Wildavsky poses is whether we are “looking differently at essentially the 
same sorts of experience?” (1978, p. 32). The above explanation that some members of the public are 
irrational risk assessors already suggests this to be the case. Ceteris paribus, a fearful individual will judge 
technological risk differently than an individual who is not fearful. Different judgments arise because 
the latter is likely to perceive much lower levels of risk than the former. However, perceiving greater 
                                                 
1 Emphasis added. 
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risk where fear may be responsible does not clarify whether fear itself causes risk differences, or if fear is 
an expression of risk differences.  
Just as sports fans predictably express outrage when a penalty is called against their team or a 
political supporter predictably expresses grave concern about an opponent’s behaviour or policy, the 
expression of fear toward a technology may be biased along partisan lines. Thus, a second explanation 
for why citizens mistake technological risk is because individual risk perceptions are a product of 
cultural values (Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990). For example, those who believe that individuals 
are responsible for securing the conditions which enable human flourishing (‘individualists’ for short) 
tend to have much different risk perceptions than those with opposite values who believe that 
communities are responsible for providing the conditions sufficient for human flourishing 
(‘communitarians’ for short). Empirical evidence suggests that communitarians tend to perceive higher 
risk toward technologies such as GMOs and nuclear energy than individualists (Kahan & Braman, 
2006). Interestingly, this pattern flips for vaccines, with individualists perceiving higher risk than 
communitarians. And similar patterns have been found between cultural values and risk perceptions 
on other contentious issues such as gun rights, climate change, and nanotechnology2. Therefore, based 
on theory and research examining the relationship between cultural values and risk perceptions, it 
appears citizens’ risk assessments are predictably biased along partisan cultural lines. 
The aforementioned irrationality and cultural value explanations for mistaken public risk 
perceptions are of course explanations for one and the same problem, namely the tendency of 
members of the public, in particular cases, to amplify technological risk despite evidence and expert 
opinion to the contrary. Whatever the root cause is – be it irrationality, pre-existing value bias, or 
something entirely different – a public convinced that low-risk technology is high-risk poses a problem 
for anyone interested in ensuring citizens’ attitudes are consistent with facts and evidence.  
For policymakers, conflicting public and expert attitudes make policymaking difficult. In a 
modern democratic society public attitudes can and should inform government policy. However, such 
an ideal is shaky when public fear of vaccines, GMOs, and nuclear energy technology fails to withstand 
scientific scrutiny. The dilemma for policymakers then becomes how to formulate policy when some 
                                                 
2 See http://www.culturalcognition.net/papers-topical/ for a comprehensive and updated list of published papers. 
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members of the public strongly oppose the scientific community. If policies are formulated on 
controversial technologies consistent with available evidence, citizens skeptical of the evidence may 
react in protest. Yet if policies are formulated in ways to ameliorate public concern, experts and 
citizens who agree with them will point to the policy being inconsistent with evidence. Thus, 
formulating policy in ways that balance conflicting risk assessments is a difficult task.   
Unfortunately, policymakers may not even have the luxury of balancing skeptical public and 
expert assessments. Similar to sports or political rivalries where groups of individuals support only one 
side, when public disagreement about hazards posed from controversial technologies becomes 
polarized those engaged in heated public debate tend to support only one side. When pro- and anti- 
vaccine, GMO, or nuclear energy groups form, the logic of polarization removes common ground and 
pits groups of individuals against one another. Like rivalries between the Boston Bruins and Montreal 
Canadiens or Republicans and Democrats, pro- and anti- controversial technology proponents are 
biased to promote only those reasons or pieces of evidence supportive of their group. Since both sides 
will claim to have evidence and experts which favour their respective positions, policy activity for a 
controversial technology will be interpreted by polarized groups as choosing a side to satisfy ends that 
are political, not scientific. As a result, even-handed policymaking becomes extremely difficult for 
controversial technologies. In such cases, neither expert consensus nor compelling evidence is enough 
to bridge the partisan divide.  
The motivation for this research project is to understand and address public perception of risk 
for the purpose of ameliorating bias when interpreting facts. Taking as a starting point from Wildvasky 
two factors which distort public assessments of risk – fear and looking differently at the same sort of 
experience – the present research project has two aims: first, to understand how fear and cultural 
values3 bias risk perceptions; and second, to examine how a communication-based treatment can 
ameliorate such bias. The first aim will be explored in this thesis and the second aim will be the focus 
point in a forthcoming project. The task in this thesis is to focus on what causes biased public risk 
perceptions.  
                                                 
3 Note that the terms “cultural values” “worldview”, and “way of life” will be used interchangeably to avoid repetition. 
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To understand how fear and cultural values bias risk perceptions, this thesis examines first the 
broad phenomenon of how cultural values affect risk perceptions toward controversial technologies 
among ordinary Canadians. This relationship is of importance in the Canadian context because, 
hitherto, only 1 published study has been conducted Canada-wide using the same cultural value 
measurement scale used in the present study (see Dragojlovic & Einsiedel, 2014). As such, this thesis 
aims to answer the broad research question: Are risk perceptions a function of cultural values among Canadians? 
Second, this thesis will compare how cultural values and public irrationality affect risk 
perceptions in the context of nuclear energy. Since public irrationality is the conventional way of 
understanding how poor public risk assessments arise, using it will provide a baseline from which to 
measure how strongly cultural values affect perceptions of risk. As such, this thesis aims to answer a 
second more specific research question: In the context of nuclear energy, do cultural values or public irrationality 
have more influence on how ordinary citizens mistake low-risk technology as high-risk? 
Though four different controversial technologies are referenced in this study – vaccines, 
homeopathic medicine, GMOs, and nuclear energy – nuclear energy will be the ultimate focus. Apart 
from helping to narrow the scope of analysis and providing a manageable context to answer the more 
specific second research question, nuclear energy is a technology that generates high levels of fear even 
though it is widely used in several countries. Further, nuclear energy is topical; it has recently entered 
the debate on climate change as an alternative to carbon emitting energy production technologies, and 
has recently benefited from technological developments. Both of these developments are prompting 
some policymakers to consider the viability of including nuclear energy as part of their energy policy. 
And so, before moving forward, the remainder of this introduction will provide a very brief exposition 
of the role risk perceptions occupy with respect to nuclear energy policy. The first chapter will 
investigate both the concept of risk and the different ways in which it is assessed. The second chapter 
will discuss the survey method used for gathering and analyzing data to provide an empirical insight. 
The third chapter will present the results, the fourth chapter will analyze the results, and the final 
chapter will draw some conclusions.   
1.1   NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY 
Nuclear energy is on the policy agenda for many members of the global community as a feasible 
energy production option (WNA, 2014). Data collected by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
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(IAEA, 2015) shows some nations are capitalizing on this feasibility, as evidenced by an upward trend 
in the last decade in the number of new nuclear power facilities beginning construction around the 
globe. To put this into perspective, the IAEA (2015) claims there have been 79 new construction starts 
in the last decade compared with 32 during the prior decade. Hailed by some observers as a “nuclear 
renaissance”, this revival has been attributed to three simultaneous drivers: a rise in demand for 
electricity, the recognition that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contribute to climate change, and the 
need to shift electricity production away from finite fossil fuels (Bratt, 2012). Even with the recent 
Fukushima nuclear accident, the nuclear renaissance shows no signs of slowing. Forecasts suggest that 
160 or more reactors are planned to come online in the next decade with hundreds more down the 
pipeline (WNA, 2014). Therefore, faced with mounting pressure to meet increasing energy demands 
while taking action on climate change, many countries will likely include nuclear as part of their energy 
mix. 
 Some object to nuclear energy on the basis that these power plants are too large for use in 
small jurisdictions by dint of producing excessive energy. Some also object that such plants are too 
costly. As a response to these and other criticisms, recent technological advances in nuclear reactor 
designs have created a next generation nuclear energy producer known as small modular reactors 
(SMRs) (IAEA, 2014). Unlike existing nuclear reactors, which on average produce 867 megawatts of 
electricity4, SMRs are designed to power up to 300 megawatts. Moreover, SMRs can be built and 
shipped from factories, potentially reducing both construction time and construction related costs. 
With SMR deployment projected between 2025-2030, Canada has been identified as an ideal market 
for the implementation of SMRs due to its infrastructure, historical nuclear industry knowledge, and its 
need to supply energy to both rural and northern populations (Canada’s Public Policy Forum, 2013). 
 But technological advances are only impactful if they pass critical public policy tests. For SMR 
technology, the regulatory tests are demanding for what is an unproven energy producing product, but 
the political, economic, and social feasibility tests are even more daunting, particularly the requirement 
that public opinion be satisfied on matters of safety. Policy makers poised to pursue a SMR agenda 
must recognize that since SMRs are a member of the nuclear family, and since public opinion matters 
                                                 
4 Average was calculated by dividing the MWe total net installed capacity (383,580) by the number of nuclear power reactors 
in operation (442) source as of Feb 25, 2016: https://www.iaea.org/pris/  
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more in nuclear policy than most other policy making areas, how the public perceives nuclear energy 
can make or break any nuclear agenda (OECD, 2010). The bottom line is that no nuclear agenda in 
Canada will be effective without dealing directly with public risk perceptions toward nuclear energy 
technology.  
1.1.1   A Saskatchewan Case 
Recent efforts in Saskatchewan at pursuing a nuclear agenda demonstrate the significance of public 
perception. In October 2008 the Uranium Development Partnership (UDP) was formed by Premier 
Brad Wall’s Saskatchewan government. Comprised of twelve members from “the top reaches of the 
nuclear industry”, the UDP was chiefly tasked with examining the nuclear sector and then creating 
recommendations for the government of Saskatchewan, and ultimately advising on value-added 
opportunities from the uranium industry (Bratt, 2012, p. 183). In a report released March 2009, one 
key recommendation from the UDP was that, in the medium term (2015-2025), the first nuclear 
generation units should be commissioned in the Province (Florizone, 2009).   
 Between April and July 2009, the Saskatchewan government appointed a former provincial 
deputy minister, Dan Perrins, to lead a public consultation process to gather public feedback about the 
UDP report (Bratt, 2012). Tasked with the mandate to “summariz[e] public input and feedback from 
stakeholders and citizens”, Perrins’s findings revealed in a September 2009 report that 84 percent of 
respondents were opposed to nuclear power generation (Bratt, 2012, p. 21). However, the government 
of Saskatchewan received Perrins’s report with caution. This caution was evident by Energy Minister 
Bill Boyd’s public comment that, “when I look at this report, it’s neither a green light nor a red light 
for the future uranium development. It’s more like a yellow light – take any next steps with caution” 
(Bratt, 2012, p. 196). 
 Following months of deliberation, the Saskatchewan government decided against the UDP 
recommendation to commission a nuclear power plant in the medium term (Bratt, 2012). Further, the 
government characterized the report’s findings as merely reflective of the views of 85 percent of 
responders – not Saskatchewan residents’ writ large – who oppose nuclear power generation. In the 
affirmative, the government did encourage investing in small-scale reactor technology and directed 
SaskPower to include nuclear power as an energy generation option after 2020.   
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 As Bratt notes, the government ultimately delayed its decision on nuclear power generation 
solely out of cost considerations (Bratt, 2012). The delayed decision claim is consistent with a remark 
made by Premier Wall in January 2011, who stated “this isn’t the end of the nuclear centre story, 
either. You’ll see us moving with private partners on the small reactor side” (Hall & Paulson, 2009). 
However, delaying solely out of presumably financial cost considerations is far from a foregone 
conclusion. An additional factor was the political cost of public opinion. That is to say, strong reported 
opposition meant that the government of Saskatchewan could not have proceeded with nuclear power 
even if it wanted to.  
Although the government received the Perrins’s report with caution, it is unclear how the 
broader public received the report. Such uncertainty meant the possibility of a strong public backlash, 
fueled by the 85 percent opposition cited in the Perrins’ report, had Wall’s government proceeded with 
implementing a nuclear agenda. In other words, public perception against nuclear energy was 
strategically leveraged by opponents of nuclear energy in a way that stifled a nuclear agenda in 
Saskatchewan. A lesson learned for the Saskatchewan government and other observant jurisdictions is 
that public perception exists as a very real and important kind of cost consideration. 
1.2   NUCLEAR ENERGY RISK 
Understanding how the public perceives nuclear energy matters a lot for nuclear energy development. 
Research has shown that there is a correlation between how the public perceives nuclear energy in a 
broad sense and how the public perceives nuclear energy risk (Sjöberg, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters 
& MacGregor, 2004; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz 2007). Yet as some in the nuclear energy 
debate contend, strong negative perception of nuclear energy risk is inconsistent with facts about the 
realities of risk. According to data produced by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC, 
2015), 40 years of nuclear operations in Canada have resulted in a total of zero nuclear accidents with 
consequences to human health or the environment. Globally, nuclear has the lowest number of 
accidents and fatalities (direct and indirect) compared with other energy sources (Figure 1). In fact, 
with the exception of Chernobyl, not a single person has died as a result of radiation exposure from a 
commercial nuclear reactor incident (WNA, 2015).  
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Global Fatal Accidents (Direct and Indirect) Across Fossil, Hydro, and Nuclear Energy (1969-
2000) 
Energy Source Accidents Fatalities 
Coal 1,221 25,107 
Oil 397 20,218 
Natural Gas 135 2,043 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas 105 3,921 
Hydro 11 29,938 
Nuclear 1 31 
Figure 1. Number of accidents and fatalities across energy sources. Adapted from Burgherr, P., & Hirschberg, 
S. (2008). A comparative analysis of accident risks in fossil, hydro, and nuclear energy chains. Human and 
Ecological Risk Assessment, 14(5), p. 959. 
There is, in fact, a strong safety case for nuclear energy, and an even stronger case for harm 
avoided from producing energy with nuclear. According to a 2013 NASA study, between 1971 and 
2009 a total of 1.84 million human deaths and 64 gigatonnes of CO2 emissions were prevented by 
using nuclear energy (Kharecha & Hansen). As these authors note, when substituted for fossil fuels, 
nuclear energy has significantly reduced harmful impacts on human health and the environment. More 
specifically, nuclear energy has prevented significantly more human deaths than it has caused and has 
reduced the impact of climate change caused by burning fossil fuels. 
Despite the testimony of experts to its safety and benefits, members of the public perceive 
nuclear energy as high risk. A 2012 public opinion survey found that 55 percent of Canadian 
respondents believe the word ‘dangerous’ describes nuclear energy ‘very well’ or ‘extremely well’ 
(Canadian Nuclear Association, 2012). In 2011, a public opinion poll conducted in twenty-four 
countries found that 62 percent of respondents opposed the use of nuclear energy (Ipsos-Mori). 
Nuclear energy fear and aversion likely arise from both history and imagination. The consequences of 
nuclear power plant accidents (such as Chernobyl or Three Mile Island) and the existential threat from 
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nuclear weapons are both frightening. Moreover, other problems such as waste storage and nuclear 
proliferation are largely unresolved and perceived as significant challenges confronting nuclear power 
production. From the public’s perspective, nuclear energy development is a dangerous prospect 
because of accidents, waste, proliferation, and association with weapons and cancer. 
Like all energy sources, nuclear energy does have a number of challenges. But unlike other 
energy sources, public fear is both unique among disruptive technologies. Whatever the reasons for 
opposing it, on a visceral level nuclear energy is generally perceived as a ‘dread risk’. That is, 
psychometric indicators of perceived nuclear energy risk have been shown to correlate strongly with 
the following: “lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the inequitable 
distribution of risks and benefits” (Slovic, 1987, p. 283). Many individuals, it appears, fear nuclear 
energy and perceive its risk at an extreme level.  
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CHAPTER II.  
RISK AND RISK PERCEPTIONS 
This chapter explores the concept of risk by first tracing its historical roots and then describing how it 
can be known from a philosophical viewpoint. Establishing that the concept of risk is disputed among 
epistemological schools of thought reveals how and why multiple interpretations of risk arise on one 
and the same object. According to one interpretation, risk is a perceived phenomenon that is most 
congenial to how ordinary citizens assess risk. Why perceiving risk causes citizens to be poor assessors 
is addressed by two theories – one arguing that cognitive biases mar assessments and the other arguing 
that group allegiances befuddle accurate assessments.  
2.1  THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION OF RISK 
In the course of human history, ‘risk’ has only recently emerged as a way of understanding the world. 
Peter Bernstein (1996) contends that prior to the concept of risk there was belief in fate –the idea that 
humans are at the mercy of forces beyond our agency. Risk as a new perspective blossomed in the 
wake of three key developments. First, the introduction of the Indian number system further refined 
our understanding of mathematics, thereby altering our ability to represent moments past, present, and 
future in a numerical, codified, and thus logically consistent way. Second, the scientific revolution 
introduced a means of systematically conceptualizing cause and effect relationships. With the scientific 
method as a tool in hand, humans became able to test and catalogue spatio-temporal relationships 
among variables, leading to a more sophisticated understanding of observed reality. Third, the 
Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment period crumbled pillars of fatalistic thought, and from 
the rubble emerged a belief that human beings are in control of their own destiny. Thus, rather than 
being pawns in some metaphysical game of chance or relying on just-so causal stories to make sense of 
the world, the concept of risk was born. 
Risk, however, is epistemologically complex. As Hannson (2014) contends, knowledge about 
risk is knowledge about lack of knowledge. Acknowledging the existence of risk signals that something 
is either unknown or has an uncertain outcome. The great cosmic mystery of black holes has an 
element of risk, as too does placing a bet in roulette. Further exacerbating this quagmire of what risk is 
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is our sheer ignorance of the overwhelming complexities which effect estimates of risk, such as the 
behaviour of complex systems – solar systems, political systems, climate systems, economic systems, 
etc. – systems which have a high volume of moving parts alongside innumerable possible interactions. 
Risk, therefore, is epistemologically a known unknown.  
The epistemological complexity is undeniable: we cannot know with certainty the risks we 
confront. However, this is not a problem with risk per se, but part of a more general problem. No 
human or known-entity has complete knowledge, and as such, no human or known-entity can be 
aware of all hazards at all times. This limitation of the human condition has led thinkers such as Mary 
Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982) to argue that we cannot know the dangers we face, but “we 
must act as if we do” (pg. 1). To this end, risk science acts by taking a step forward, wedding the 
existence of hazards with the constraints of human cognition. The result is that armchair musings 
about risk are replaced by a research enterprise aimed at better understanding fundamental questions, 
including but not limited to: how do individuals decide which risks to take and which to avoid? Why 
are some hazards safeguarded against while others are discounted or dismissed?  And how do people 
know the nature and scale of the risks they are exposed to?  
Contemporary risk science is not stifled by an absence of knowledge about risk in a 
philosophical sense. Rather, philosophical positions are adopted as axiomatic starting points necessary 
for arriving at the desired end point of understanding risk in a practical sense, as a piece of reality that 
can be assessed, communicated, and managed (Phillips, 2009). We will take up the assessment aspect of risk 
presently; it is fundamental to how individuals formulate their risk beliefs. A treatment on the 
communication and management of risk is scheduled for a forthcoming project. For now, however, to 
gain a glimpse into contemporary risk science and how this field makes sense of risk assessments, it is 
helpful to first touch upon positivist and naturalist interpretations of knowledge-gathering to observe 
the effect commitment to a particular philosophical school of thought has on downstream assessments 
of risk. 
2.2   RISK AS A CALCULATED ASSESSMENT 
Broadly speaking, positivists adopt the epistemic position that knowledge acquired can only preserve 
its rationality if arrived at by using a specific rule or method (Shrader-Frechette, 1990). While typically 
applied to philosophy of language, logic, or scientific inquiry, when applied to risk it follows that the 
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strongest assessments of risk are generally those derived from a standardized rule or method. Such an 
approach toward analyzing risk is therefore generally favoured by communities who privilege rules or 
methods as a form of knowledge gathering, such as communities of experts, analysts, and those in the 
so-called hard sciences. These communities assess risk using agreed upon methods that produce 
assessments deemed objective and technical. This is what it means to assess risk in a calculated sense. 
According to Hannson (2014), a calculated risk assessment is the product of measuring the 
probability or statistical expectation of an unwanted event which may or may not occur. Concentrating 
efforts toward identifying unwanted events – unwanted because they may cause harm or damage – 
enables forecasting the occurrence of such an event. Forecasting the likelihood of an unwanted event, 
in turn, opens up the option to implement measures to safeguard against it. In cases whereby multiple 
interpretations regarding the likelihood of a risk event arise, the agreed upon assessment is settled by 
interpretation of probability. In sum, calculated risk assessments are typically quantitative, precise 
insofar as having numerical specificity, and are hallmarked by a focus on the likelihood of an event 
occurring and/or the magnitude of harm.  
One example of a calculated risk assessment is a ‘Probabilistic Risk Assessment’. This method 
is often used by experts when calculating risk in nuclear power plants (Goodfellow et al., 2011). For 
example, experts may calculate risk using the equation: 
        
 
   
 
This equation calculates risk (R) as the product of the probability (Pi) of a future risk event occurring 
and the magnitude of consequences (Ci) of such an event, summed over all previous occurrences (n) of 
the event. This equation, deceptively simple looking, can be enormously complex. This is because a 
large amount of data is required to arrive at a Probability Risk Assessment. Data are required not just 
for calculating each potential component failure, but also for sets of components, for interactions 
among components, and for multiple sequences of events.  
2.3   RISK AS A PERCEIVED ASSESSMENT 
An alternative philosophical risk position starts from the premise that there is no absolutely reliable 
method for guaranteeing certain knowledge (Shrader-Frechette, 1990). Rather than focusing on 
calculated risk generated by rule-following, a la positivists, this naturalistic perspective proposes 
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understanding how beliefs about risk are formulated. Understanding the cognitive mechanisms by 
which we humans formulate and propagate beliefs provides insight into how we humans do assess risk 
as opposed to how we should. A naturalistic perspective will, arguably, lead to greater insight into the 
psycho-social mechanisms individuals rely upon when they assess risk. This general approach to 
assessing risk is commonly referred to as subjective, multidimensional, or perceived. 
A perceived risk approach is one that examines attitudes and expectations informing 
assessments of risk (Hannson, 2014). To be clear, the term ‘perception’ is a misnomer as risk in this 
sense is about beliefs and values, not perceiving in the narrow more literal sense of the term. A 
perceived risk assessment is a value-laden judgment about the cause of an unwanted event or the event 
itself, which may or may not occur. Perceived risk assessments are typically qualitative, comprehensive, 
and focused on the cause or the event itself rather than its likelihood.  
Studies show that factors such as gender and political preferences are strongly correlated with 
risk assessments (Slovic, 1999). Moreover, these factors affect risk judgments in all persons, experts 
and laypersons alike and have been demonstrated in a number of studies. For example, a so-called 
‘white male effect’ has been uncovered, suggesting white men assess risks as both smaller and less 
problematic than women or minorities (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & 
Mertz 2007). Even among scientists, a group one might regard as relatively immune from risk bias, 
females were found to perceive risks in nuclear technology and toxicology as higher relative to their 
male counterparts. Similarly, political ideology and subjective assessments of nuclear energy risk show 
a strong persisting relationship within Eurobarometer data dating back to 1978 (Franchino, 2014). 
Results from Franchino (2014) show politically left-of-centre respondents have much stronger nuclear 
energy risk concerns than their right-of-centre counterparts – a finding he contends is consistent with 
other research. 
2.4   RISK ASSESSMENT GULF 
What then is the proper recourse in circumstances where disagreements emerge between expert and 
public assessments of risk on one and the same object or event? Before overstating the occurrence of 
such disagreement, research indicates that in most cases of risk, citizens tend to defer risk assessments 
to expert testimony (Kahan et al., 2015). For instance, hazards due to power lines, side-effects from 
medications, advisories to boil water, labels denoting expired products, and other similar kinds of cases 
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reflect the extent to which citizens entrust what science says and respond appropriately. However, 
there are cases in which strong disagreement occurs. On topics such as climate change, genetically 
modified foods, nuclear power, and vaccines, to varying degrees members of the public resist the risk 
assessment claims forwarded from the scientific community. In the nuclear energy context for 
example, there exists a gulf between some ordinary citizens who perceive nuclear energy as a high risk 
activity and the scientific community who largely agree nuclear energy is safer than many routine, daily 
activities (Goodfellow, 2011). 
One response to public resistance is to distinguish each kind of risk assessment according to its 
utility. According to Kasperson et al., (1988), while calculated risk assessments are no doubt useful for 
decisions about precise items such as competing designs or materials, they are too dependent on a 
narrow set of assumptions to inform much broader societal decisions about technology. For example, 
assessing risk as a function of the probability of occurrence and the magnitude of harm neglects equity 
issues, such as harm in relation to time (future generations), space (‘not in my back yard’ or NIMBY), 
or social grouping (those marginalized or exploited). The fundamental problem is that equity issues are 
very difficult to quantify, and as such calculated risk assessments are “too narrow and ambiguous to 
serve as the crucial yardstick for policy making” (Kasperson et al. 1988, 178). Thus, some argue that a 
best practice application of calculated risk assessments toward technology appear most suitable for 
circumstances with clear, well-defined boundaries.  
For nuclear energy technology, the contradiction is that this same technology is simultaneously 
accepted by most experts as safe and resisted by most Canadians as dangerous. Public fear toward its 
hazardous nature is flawed in contrast with expert testimony; however, expert calculations appear 
flawed by neglecting factors outside the scope of quantification. The result is a gulf between expert 
and public risk assessments toward nuclear energy. The proper recourse in addressing this gulf, then, is 
to properly locate wherein lies the problem. Both sides have their respective problems – calculated risk 
appears incomplete whereas perceived risk appears inaccurate. But since the label ‘dangerous’ is 
inconsistent with facts about harm from nuclear energy, and since attitudes toward nuclear energy 
matter a great deal for the prospects of a nuclear agenda, the focus hereafter will be on the domain of 
risk perception.   
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2.5   THE PUBLIC IRRATIONALITY THESIS 
Both cognitive science and behavioural economics have long held that ordinary citizens are remarkably 
poor evaluators of risk. One predominant explanation begins with the observation that intuitive 
judgments are often marred by cognitive biases if left uncorrected (Kahneman, 2003). For risk 
research, acknowledging the role of bias in intuitive judgment is instructive precisely because those 
cognitive mechanisms responsible for bias may also be responsible for inaccurate assessments of 
hazards. Furthermore, ordinary citizens also tend to have a poor comprehension of what the science 
says. That is, most individuals are likely to be deficient in both their knowledge about technical 
literature as well as their capacity to think like experts trained to detect and ameliorate bias (Kahan, 
2015). Instead of using the best available evidence, laypersons will rely upon intuition and emotion 
when making risk assessments. This interpretation of public risk perceptions is known as the public 
irrationality thesis (PIT). 
 Applying cognitive science insights to behavioural economics, Cass Sunstein contends that 
reliance upon intuitive modes of thinking is the source of a problem known as misfearing (2013). 
Misfearing is defined as a two-sided cognitive bias describing puzzling circumstances in which ordinary 
individuals are afraid of trivial risks or are neglectful of serious risks. Focusing on the fear toward the 
trivial risk side of misfearing, Sunstein (2013) identifies an intuitive bias known as the ‘availability 
heuristic’ as responsible for inducing misfearing among some individuals. This heuristic, a term 
synonymous with ‘mental shortcut’, efficiently brings to mind highly publicized and emotional events 
such as airplane crashes, nuclear power plant accidents, SARS, terrorism, etc. The idea is that our 
brains can readily bring these visceral events to mind, and that ease causes some individuals to 
overestimate the likelihood of a hazardous event occurring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In short, 
misfearing toward nuclear power generation occurs because of the availability heuristic – that is, 
individuals overestimate nuclear energy risk due to mental associations tied to memorable high profile 
disasters such as Chernobyl, Three-Mile Island, and Fukushima (Sunstein, 2013).  
If misfearing is a problem confronting nuclear energy, what then is an effective corrective? 
Cognitive science studies show that those few who are adept at correcting their own errors of 
judgments tend to have two characteristics: comparatively higher cognitive capacities and the ability to 
utilize analytic reasoning to resolve bias (Stanovich, 1999). One way to mitigate intuitive bias, then, is 
through a deliberative corrective (Kahneman, 2002). Rather than permitting error prone intuitions to 
 
17 
formulate assessments of risk, if individuals instead think carefully about risks they will produce a more 
even-handed risk assessment. A more even-handed risk assessment will, ipso facto, eliminate misfearing. 
Thus, to counteract misfearing toward nuclear energy, those individuals able to think carefully and 
systematically about risks should fairly assess nuclear energy hazards.  
Given the popularity of PIT as an explanation for public risk perceptions, this study will 
analyze the relationship between risk perceptions and those individuals who are most likely to overcome 
bias taken as those who think carefully about risks. This study assumes that those who are most likely 
to think carefully about nuclear energy risk are those who have a greater knowledge about the subject 
matter. While there is an argument that level of education promotes careful thinking, formal education 
is an unlikely surrogate for understanding risk. Education is a strong predictor of a number of skills, 
but those do not include understanding computer troubleshooting, retirement savings, or risk 
perceptions. Further, as Kahan & Braman (2006) argue, factual disagreements on controversial 
technologies continue even after controlling for education. Thus, while we will examine the effects of 
general education, our main focus will be on specific knowledge: do participants with greater 
knowledge about nuclear energy assess nuclear risk largely free from misfearing?  
Knowledge is being used for two reasons. First, it is unclear to this researcher how one might 
measure public irrationality. Second, if individuals have knowledge about nuclear energy that is 
consistent with experts, then they should also perceive nuclear energy as low risk like experts. To turn 
PIT into a testable hypothesis, three true or false questions about nuclear energy will serve as a proxy 
for measuring public irrationality. Scores from these three questions will allow the researcher to 
analyze whether basic knowledge of nuclear energy correlates with risk perceptions of nuclear energy 
(see section 3.4.3 for a discussion of the basic knowledge questions used).  
2.6   MOTIVATED REASONING 
If having a public that independently assesses risk consistent with the norms of scientific research is 
the benchmark of public rationality, then public irrationality may be inevitable. This strong claim about 
public irrationality is derived from a phenomenon known as motivated reasoning – a tendency to 
conform assessments of evidence to a goal unrelated to accuracy (Kahan, 2015; Kunda 1990). 
Motivated reasoning among sports fans illustrates how such bias operates. In the 1950s a psychological 
experiment by Hastorf & Cantril (1954) presented a series of controversial referee calls to students 
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from two rival colleges whose teams had recently competed in a football game. The researchers 
selected a series of calls that penalized only one particular team, showed the footage to participants 
from both colleges, and then gave participants an opportunity to provide feedback on those calls. 
Rather than identify each illegal play as illegal, students from the penalized team’s college reported half 
as many illegal plays relative to students from the rival college. Hastorf & Cantril (1954) concluded that 
group allegiances motivated student assessments in a way that favoured their own school.  
Research from Kahan et al. (2015) suggests a similar group allegiance effect in the domain of 
risk perceptions. They found that individuals with opposing cultural values are reliably guided toward 
opposing views on risk. For example, those who value individualism are more likely to oppose 
mandatory vaccinations citing infringement on personal liberties than those who value collectivism and 
are more likely to support vaccinations citing lives saved. As a result, both groups are likely to have 
opposing interpretations of vaccination risks. What these findings illuminate is one possible alternative 
explanation for misfearing. That is, it may be the case that significant numbers of people who misfear 
nuclear energy do so not because their risk perceptions are the product of defective intuitive 
judgements, but because their risk perceptions are motivated by cultural groups with whom they 
identify.  
There exists evidence in support of the assertion that assessments can be biased in a way that 
favours the group to which the assessor identifies with at the expense of accuracy. Just as sports fans 
are motivated to support their team, ordinary citizens are motivated to adopt risk assessments in a way 
that is consistent with their group’s evaluation. Behaving this way could mean an individual will likely 
stand a better chance of continuing emotional and material support from in-group members in 
comparison with an individual who adopts a position contrary to the group (Kahan et al., 2015). It is 
simple to imagine, for example, the benefits for an anti-nuclear activist working at Greenpeace versus 
the costs for that identical person working in a pro-nuclear industry. Another plausible motivator is 
that an ordinary citizen may adopt a position consistent with her cultural group because she is not in a 
position to fully investigate the evidence, and as a kind of heuristic adopts a position based on whom 
she trusts (Kahan & Braman, 2006). The trusted source is likely to be someone who belongs to a 
shared group espousing similar points of view. Thus, there are strong motivators which steer 
assessments toward a goal of consistency with group commitments rather than a goal of accuracy. 
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As Lodge & Taber (2013, p. 150) argue, underlying all human reasoning is a “competitive 
tension between the drive for accuracy and belief perseverance”. Indeed, some individuals are 
motivated by accuracy goals insofar as they deliberately consider evidence by weighing the validity and 
fairness of competing claims before arriving at correct or good-enough conclusions. Such behaviour is 
akin to established norms of science. However, some individual behaviour is more responsive to social 
cues. That is, some individuals are motivated by partisan goals, and as such fit the evidence to a pre-
existing conclusion. What motivated reasoning explains is that ordinary citizens’ assessments of risk 
are simply behaviour consistent with norms other than those relied upon by science. Thus, accuracy is 
but one goal. And as such, narrowly defining public rationality as pursuit of the privileged goal of 
accuracy discounts perfectly rational behaviour associated with pursuing some other goal. 
2.7   A CULTURAL THEORY OF RISK 
According to cultural theory, perceptions of risk are the product of a social process (Thompson, Ellis 
& Wildavsky 1990). On this view, individual risk perceptions are a function of a particular set of 
beliefs, values, and social relationships – a ‘way of life’ for short. The main idea is that individual risk 
perceptions are thought to reflect and reinforce a cultural way of life (Kahan, 2012). But before describing 
the relationship between ways of life and risk perceptions, knowing first the kinds of social 
organizations or ways of life to which individuals subscribe will aid in an exposition of how and why 
the relationship exists. 
To characterize different ways of life, cultural theorist Mary Douglas pioneered a framework 
with two dimensions consisting of two sets of parsimonious values called ‘group’ and ‘grid’ (1970). 
According to Thompson et al., (1990): 
Group refers to the extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units. The greater the 
incorporation, the more individual choice is subject to group determination. Grid denotes the degree to 
which an individual’s life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions (p. 5) 
Depicted in Figure 2 is a contemporary adaptation of the cultural framework used by a group 
of scholars working on the Cultural Cognition Project5. The framework has retained the group-grid 
values distinction a la Douglas, but includes also four ways of life: individualism, hierarchical, 
                                                 
5 http://www.culturalcognition.net/  
 
20 
communitarian, and egalitarianism. Located on the left side of the X-axis is a low group worldview, termed 
individualism. The far left extreme represents a worldview whereby individuals themselves are 
responsible for securing the conditions which enable human flourishing, emphasizing that such activity 
is free from collective interference or assistance (Kahan, 2012; Braman, Kahan, Slovic, Gastil, & 
Cohen, 2007). On the opposite side of the spectrum is a high group worldview, or communitarian. 
Here, collective interests trump individual interests, designating society as responsible for providing 
the conditions necessary for individual flourishing (Kahan, 2012; Braman et al., 2007).  
Cultural Framework 
 
Figure 2. Contemporary ‘group-grid’ cultural framework. Kahan, D. M. (2012). Cultural cognition as a 
conception of the cultural theory of risk. In Handbook of risk theory (p 725-759). Springer Netherlands. 
On the top of the Y-axis is a high grid worldview. On this view, social factors such as rights, 
duties, goods, and offices should be distributed differentially and in accordance with established social 
characteristics (e.g., gender, wealth, lineage, ethnicity) (Kahan, 2012; Braman et al., 2007). Alternatively, 
a low grid worldview suggests that those same social factors should be distributed equally, independent 
from any social characteristic. The former denotes hierarchy whereas the latter denotes egalitarianism. 
Returning now to how and why there exists a relationship between cultural ways of life and 
risk perceptions, cultural theory offers two responses. First, individuals perceive risk in ways that reflect 
existing cultural ways of life. As a reflective relationship, cultural theorists make no claims regarding 
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the causal ordering between risk perceptions and cultural ways of life (Thompson et al., 1990). What 
matters is not the order in which the relationship functions, but that there is a reflective function to the 
relationship. A mirroring effect occurs because individuals with similar values will have similar fears 
and will coalesce toward particular ways of life – meanwhile a particular way of life is the sum total of a 
set of shared values and fears (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).  
Second, individuals perceive risk in a manner that reinforces their commitments with a 
worldview. According to Douglas & Wildavsky (1982) each worldview (individualism, hierarchy, 
communitarian, and egalitarianism) represents different positions regarding how an ideal society ought 
to be arranged. For those who place a high personal value on their way of life, the preoccupation with 
transforming a societal arrangement from ought to is strengthens commitments to that way of life. 
Being aligned with a particular way of life, resulting from reflecting and reinforcing mechanisms, 
means individuals are inheriting a particular way of looking at the world. Bundled into that worldview 
is a particular risk portfolio which highlights some risks and neglects others. For risk perceptions, 
therefore, subscribing to a particular way of life and an accompanying risk portfolio gives rise to a 
group-based bias when assessing risk. 
Piecing together worldviews with motivations opens up a coherent explanation for why 
individuals sometimes disagree strongly on risk despite available evidence that could conceivably be 
employed to settle the disagreement. When individuals hold cultural commitments their risk 
perceptions are constructed to reflect and reinforce those commitments. As such, individuals with 
similar values will assess risk in allegiance with a cultural way of life, independent from and sometimes 
conflicting with the best available evidence. Similar to the clear bias sports fans display when 
interpreting referee calls in favour of their preferred team, those individuals who value cultural 
allegiances more strongly than evidence will form biased risk assessments in allegiance with cultural 
commitments.  
Empirical evidence suggests that, in the case of nuclear energy, the more egalitarian and 
communitarian an individual is the more likely he or she will perceive high risk toward nuclear energy 
(Kahan & Braman, 2006). Conversely, those who are more hierarchical and individualist are more 
likely to perceive a lower level of risk. As shown in Figure 3, the authors point to the strength of these 
results for nuclear power as consistent with previous studies which find similar patterns of risk 
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perceptions on a range of polarizing issues which divide across cultural lines, such as environmental 
pollution and genetically modified foods (Kahan & Braman, 2006). 
2.8   THE CULTURAL COGNITION THESIS 
One research enterprise empirically investigating patterns between risk perceptions and cultural values 
is known as the cultural cognition thesis (CCT). As outlined by Dan Kahan (2012), the CCT is distinct 
from cultural theory insofar as it is designed primarily for three practical, methodological purposes. 
First, to measure individual cultural worldviews; second, to empirically test cultural theory claims that 
individual risk perceptions are indeed connected to their cultural worldviews; and third, to enable the 
management of strong public risk disagreement in an effort to promote “scientifically sound public 
policies that are congenial to persons of diverse outlooks” (Kahan, 2012, p. 726). This thesis focuses 
on the first two. 
Relationship Between Cultural Values and Risk Perceptions on Cultural Framework 
 
Figure 3. Patterns of risk perceptions toward technologies and the environment, plotted on the cultural 
framework. Adapted from Kahan & Braman (2006, p. 155).  
To measure individual worldviews CCT uses two attitudinal scales, one short-form and one 
long-form, to plot respondents on the group-grid cultural framework (Kahan, 2012). In total, there are 
30 questions for the long-form version and 12 for the short-form, with the latter being as reliable as 
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the former. Participants respond to a series of ‘agree-disagree’ Likert-type questions designed to 
measure cultural values derived from the ways of life typology from the cultural theory of risk. These 
scales are considered highly reliable when used for studies in the United States. Thus, the scales appear 
appropriate for empirically testing cultural theory. For a continued discussion of CCT scale usage in 
the present study, turn to section 2.4.2 in the Methodology chapter. 
Consistent with the claims made by cultural theory, previous empirical studies from CCT 
researchers show a relationship between cultural values and risk perception6. In addition to cultural 
theory which suggests that risk perceptions reflect and reinforce cultural ways of life, CCT posits that 
there are certain psychological mechanisms that are the root cause of the relationship between risk 
perceptions and ways of life (Kahan, 2012). According to Kahan et al., (2015):  
[C]ultural values are cognitively prior to facts in public risk conflicts: as a result of a complex of 
interrelated psychological mechanisms, groups of individuals will credit and dismiss evidence of risk in 
patterns that reflect and reinforce their distinctive understandings of how society should be organized. 
(p. 194)    
While there are a number of different mechanisms posited by CCT, the most noteworthy for this 
research project is ‘cultural availability’ (Kahan, 2012).  
Cultural availability is based on the aforementioned availability heuristic. This heuristic is, to 
reiterate, responsible for causing misfearing because hazards are overestimated due to the ease with 
which high profile disasters, such as Chernobyl, come to mind. But as Kahan (2012) argues, the 
availability heuristic does not explain why individuals can simultaneously agree that a certain high 
profile disaster is horrific, yet disagree about risk-relevant facts. For example, most would agree 
Fukushima was a horrific disaster. Yet there is strong disagreement about what caused the damage (i.e. 
a tsunami, a backup generator in the basement, human error, or something different) and what the 
consequences are (ranging from zero to Chernobyl-like). As a result, responses to the disaster differ; 
some believe nuclear energy production itself is to blame, others believe improper safety policies and 
procedures are to blame, and others pin responsibility on the tsunami. Why? As Kahan & Braman 
(2003) claim, such disagreement may be the result of culture: 
                                                 
6 See http://www.culturalcognition.net/papers-topical/ for a comprehensive and updated list. 
 
24 
If people are more likely to notice risk-related contingencies congenial to their cultural predispositions, 
to assign them significance consistent with their cultural predispositions, and recall instances of them 
when doing so is supportive of their cultural predispositions, then the availability effect will generate 
systematic individual differences among culturally diverse individuals. (cited in Kahan, 2012) 
Thus, if cultural values bias assessments of risk, do participants with shared cultural values assess 
nuclear risk similarly?  
2.9   CONCLUSION 
Risk is epistemologically complex. We cannot know with certainty the dangers we face, but must act as 
if we do. One way of making sense of risk is by assessing unwanted events which may cause harm or 
damage. Whereas experts generally rely upon calculating risk to minimize bias from perceiving risk, 
ordinary citizens tend not to use such a corrective. These different approaches yield different 
conclusions, in effect creating a risk assessment gulf between expert and public conceptions of risk. 
When inconsistent assessments arise, PIT emphasizes that the conflict exists because of a knowledge 
deficit between science and the public pitting public irrationality as the culprit. Motivated reasoning 
and cultural theories of risk emphasize that different segments of the population fit their 
interpretations of risk in a way that reflects and reinforces their competing ways of life. It is not a 
matter of widespread irrationality as much as different groups that assess risk differently. 
To respond to Aaron Wildavsky’s question “are some of us looking differently at essentially 
the same sorts of experience?” the answer is yes. There is strong evidence indicating both that bias 
exists, and that such bias result in vastly different interpretations of one-and-the-same technology. 
Whether these differences are a function of knowledge or values is hotly contested between CCT and 
PIT. As for Wildavsky’s question “why is the one feared and not the other?”, both PIT and CCT point 
toward cognitive constraints – heuristics, biases, and motivated reasoning – as root causes of fear. The 
remainder of this thesis will be devoted to describing an empirical investigation conducted to test these 
two theories’ claims of how controversial technology risk is assessed: as a function of basic knowledge 
or as a function of pre-existing cultural values. 
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CHAPTER III. 
METHODS AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1   STUDY OVERVIEW 
An online survey instrument was used to conduct the empirical investigation portion of this thesis. 
The survey method was chosen because it enabled the effective and efficient gathering of a wide 
variety of risk perceptions toward different controversial technologies. Further, a survey also allowed 
for the measurement of individual cultural worldviews and basic nuclear energy knowledge. Gathering 
information about risk perceptions (the key dependent variable) as well as cultural values and basic 
knowledge (key independent variables) enabled the researcher to analyze the relationship between 
these variables – a procedure necessary for both providing evidence in regards to the claims made by 
CCT, and for answering the two research questions. First, do risk perceptions run across cultural lines 
among Canadians; second, in the context of nuclear energy, do cultural worldviews or basic knowledge 
have more influence on how ordinary citizens mistake low-risk technology as high-risk?  
 Admittedly, there is a kind of incongruity studying a naturalistic phenomenon (perceptions of 
risk) using a positivist approach (a survey method using measurement scales for key variables). A 
positivist approach was ultimately used because the present study has borrowed its methodological 
approach from similar studies which examined risk perceptions which themselves used positivist 
approaches. Further, a positivist approach provided results that are simpler to gather and interpret 
than a naturalistic approach. Certainly a naturalistic methodological approach could offer rich 
attitudinal results by examining participant self reports which detail how subjects’ themselves assess 
technological risk. However, the validity of participant reports may be compromised due to the fact 
that some individuals have a limited introspective ability to report on their own cognitive processes 
(Lipshitz, Klein, and Orasanu, 2001). A positivist approach avoids this introspective limitation while 
still providing a measure of risk perceptions. Measuring attitudes on a predetermined scale gives 
participants a chance to identify which scale item they most strongly agree with, and although the 
response chosen may not wholly reflect their attitude, a positivist approach avoids both the difficult 
task of organizing a wide array of attitudes and the impossible task of comparing qualitatively different 
levels of concern towards a technology.  
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3.2   DESIGN 
The study was carried out through the Social Science Research Lab located at the University of 
Saskatchewan. Participants were recruited through the online service Probit (http://www.probit.com), 
a professional research vendor. Probit supplied a panel of respondents who were randomly selected 
and invited to join the survey. To ensure the selected sample of respondents composed a statistically 
significant representative sample of Canadian adults, two features were built into the survey. First, a 
quota was administered to counteract overrepresentation in regions. Second, the survey was made 
available in both English and French for participants to toggle between at any time. Since this survey 
aimed at sampling a representative number of Canadians, and since Canada is officially a bilingual 
country, setting a quota and providing participants with a copy of the survey in both languages were 
built-in as necessary features.  
A quota was used primarily to achieve sizable regional samples. This selection criterion 
addresses the uneven samples used in two of the three known published studies in Canada which also 
examined the connection between cultural values and risk (Dragojlovic & Einsiedel, 2014; Lachapelle, 
Montpetit, & Gauvin, 2014; Perella & Kiss, 2015). Of the three studies, only Dragojlovic & Einseidel 
(2014) was conducted across Canada whilst the others were distributed regionally. Thus, one aim of 
the present study is to fill a research gap with respect to research concerning cultural values and risk 
perceptions among Canadians coast to coast to coast.  
For the recruitment phase, participants were invited to participate in a survey study concerned 
with understanding how Canadians view scientific technologies. Concealing the true nature of the 
study – measuring risk perceptions toward controversial technologies – was deemed necessary so as to 
not arouse pre-existing attitudes toward these technologies, which could in turn jeopardize the validity 
and reliability of the results. Instead, respondents were told that their responses will help inform 
research that looks at ways to improve communicating science with citizens.  
The survey study was conducted in two waves. The first wave (W1) was administered from 
February 12-29, 2016 and the second wave (W2) was from March 7-14, 2016. Participants were 
incentivized with a gift card draw to return for W2 after a one-week delay. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the results from W1 will be the primary data examined. This is because W2 was constructed 
with the assumption that egalitarians and communitarians in Canada overestimate nuclear energy risk. 
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As such, W2 was designed as a communication based treatment to ameliorate nuclear energy 
misfearing due to cultural commitments – a topic ripe for the focus of a future paper. The only 
questions from W2 included in this thesis are those pertinent to basic knowledge of nuclear energy. 
3.3   THE SAMPLE 
Shown in Figure 4, the W1 sample size consisted of 575 Canadians. The target was to have a nationally 
representative sample of 384, based on a 95% confidence level and the population of Canada 
(35,344,962). This was a two-part study, and as such W1 was oversampled in anticipation of the 
attrition rate between waves. Oversampling W1 ensured the data gathered was statistically significant 
for W2.  
Number of Respondents (Wave 1) 
 
Figure 4. Number of survey participants from each province or territory in Canada. 
In the end a nationally representative sample was nearly achieved in W1. Nearly because 
achieving representativeness proved difficult in small jurisdictions, and ultimately Nunavut was left 
unrepresented. As such, this study can be called a nationally representative sample of Canadian 
Wave 1 
n=575 
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attitudes with the caveat that Nunavut was not included. Moreover, it is important to note that there 
are no major demographic discrepancies detected between the W1 sample and Canadians. 
3.4   MEASUREMENTS 
In W1 of the survey, participants responded to a series of measures on risk perceptions, cultural 
values, and demographics (see Appendix A-C for each scale, respectively). After agreeing to participate 
in the study participants were immediately asked to identify their region. To reiterate, quotas were set 
for each province and territory to control for regional representativeness. In terms of additional 
demographic questions, information was gathered about gender, income, level of education, Federal 
political party preference, and age. In sum, the demographic data were intended primarily as control 
variables in the subsequent analysis while the most pertinent questions probed for attitudes toward 
controversial technologies, basic knowledge, and cultural predispositions.  
3.4.1   Risk Perceptions 
The survey study gauged Canadian citizens risk perceptions toward four so-called controversial 
technologies: vaccines, homeopathic medicine, GMOs, and nuclear energy. Recall that the primary 
technology of interest is nuclear energy. The other technologies were added to mask the fact that this 
study is primarily interested in nuclear energy. However, some consideration was given to choosing 
technologies in anticipation of their interactions with cultural values. Vaccines, for example, have been 
shown in previous studies to be viewed as risky by those who hold strong individualist values (Kahan 
et al., 2015). Homeopathic medicine was speculated to be viewed as high risk by hierarchists, given 
that homeopathic medicine is not proven by experts and as such may be viewed as high risk. Finally, it 
was unclear if GMO risk perceptions would run across cultural lines, but speculated that the same 
groups who view nuclear as high risk (egalitarians and communitarians) would also view GMOs as 
high risk. Both GMOs and nuclear energy have uncertain long term consequences which could impact 
perceived collective safety.   
Shown in Error! Reference source not found.7, responses were measured using a 7-point 
Likert-type scale with each response option having a verbal label and corresponding number. The scale 
asked for risk perception responses across four separate domains: society, the economy, human health, 
                                                 
7 All risk scales are listed in Appendix B. 
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and the environment. It is important to note that there is no standardized risk scale. As such, the scale 
developed in the present study was adapted from Kahan et al., 2012. In that study, the scale measured 
risk perceptions between 0 (‘no risk’) to 10 (‘extreme risk’) and participants were asked “How much 
risk” they believed issues of “climate change” and “nuclear power” “posed to human health, safety, or 
prosperity” (p. 4).  
The scale used in the present survey study diverged from Kahan et al., 2012 in two key ways. 
First, each scale response has a verbal label and number. This change emerged from e-mail 
correspondence with Paul Slovic, a leading expert on risk perception research, who recommended 
using this kind of scale setup because it would help both the rater and reader know what each response 
means. Second, instead of asking how much risk was “posed to human health, safety, or prosperity”, 
these items were separated to avoid conflated responses. The domains were separated after a 
conversation with research facilitators at the Social Science Research Lab, in part to remove ambiguity 
during data interpretation. For example, it clarifies whether participants perceive nuclear energy to be 
high risk for the environment yet low risk for the economy. Designing the scale with these two 
suggestions allowed the present study to probe for specificity by making it clear the degree to which 
participants perceived a specific level of risk in a specific domain. 
Risk Perception Scale
 
 
Figure 5. Risk perception scale for nuclear energy. 
 
3.4.2   Cultural Values 
Subjects’ cultural values were measured using an adapted form of the short-form worldview scale by 
Kahan (2012). This 12-question scale measured agreement with a culturally charged statement using a 
6-point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Slightly Disagree, Slightly Agree, 
Moderately Agree, Strongly Agree). The scale was chosen because it is the standard scale used by CCT 
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researchers, and has been validated in the United States. It must be noted, however, an adapted 
version was used because Dan Kahan, one of the lead CCT researchers, has found that there are 
difficulties with operationalizing the CCT scales in societies other than the United States (e-mail 
correspondence). He was unsure why Canada in particular has been a difficult jurisdiction for creating 
a cross-culturally valid scale, even more so than the UK, Australia, and Austria, but did comment the 
results illustrate that Canadians are more than simply Americans who play hockey (a sentiment 
seconded by this author). 
Acknowledging the difficulty operationalizing the CCT scale in Canada, and also 
acknowledging that there is only one cross-Canada study using the cultural scale, I chose to use the 
same scale operationalized in the cross-Canada study (Dragojlovic & Einsiedel, 2014). In effect, 
Dragojlovic & Einsiedel’s scale is identical to the CCT but with two slight variants. Shown below in 
Figure 6 are the scale measures. The underlined text denotes language used in the Dragojlovic & 
Einsiedel study and subsequent square brackets denotes language used in the CCT short-form 
worldview scale. Given the close resemblance of the Dragojlovic & Einsiedel scale with the CCT 
short-form scale, testing this proximate scale provided an independent measure to validate the CCT 
claim that risk perceptions are predictable across cultural lines. 
Cultural Cognition Scale (Dragojlovic & Einseidel Version) 
 
Group 
(Individualism – Communitarianism) 
Grid 
(Hierarchy – Egalitarianism) 
People in our society often disagree about how far to let 
individuals go in making decisions for themselves. How 
strongly do you agree or disagree with each of these 
statements? 
People in our society often disagree about issues 
of equality and discrimination. How strongly do 
you agree or disagree with each of these 
statements? 
Individualism Hierarchy 
-The government interferes far too much in our everyday 
lives. 
-We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in 
this country.  
-It's not the government's business to try to protect people 
from themselves. 
-It seems like ethnic minorities [blacks], women, 
homosexuals and other groups don't want equal 
rights, they want special rights just for them. 
-The government should stop telling people how to live 
their lives. 
-Society as a whole has become too soft and 
feminine. 
Communitarianism Egalitarianism 
-Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep -Our society would be better off if the 
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people from hurting themselves. distribution of wealth was more equal. 
-The government should do more to advance society's 
goals, even if that means limiting the freedom and choices 
of individuals.  
-We need to dramatically reduce inequalities 
between the rich and the poor, whites and 
visible minorities [people of color], and men 
and women. 
-Government should put limits on the choices individuals 
can make so they don't get in the way of what's good for 
society.   
-Discrimination against minorities is still a very 
serious problem in our society. 
Figure 6. Cultural cognition scale. Note: underlined text denotes language used in this study’s scale items, 
subsequent square brackets denotes language used in the CCT short-form worldview scale. 
3.4.3   Basic Knowledge 
The survey also measured subjects’ basic knowledge of nuclear energy. Basic knowledge was collected 
to test the assertion from PIT that increased knowledge reduces misfearing. According to previous 
research, support for nuclear development increases among those who have higher levels of 
knowledge about nuclear (Ertor-Akyazi et al., 2012; Stoutenborough et al., 2013, as cited in Bourassa 
et al., 2014). As such, of the three basic knowledge questions asked, the first was from a nuclear energy 
regulator (CNSC), the second from a nuclear energy information library (WNA), and the third from a 
previous study examining nuclear energy attitudes (Nuclear Policy Research Initiative (NPRI)). Basic 
knowledge information was gathered in W2 from follow-up questions for a nuclear energy treatment. 
Although fewer responses were collected (n=402), gathering additional information specific to nuclear 
energy in W1 would likely have provoked suspicion among some respondents that the overall survey 
was nuclear energy specific.   
Shown below in Figure 7 are three True or False basic knowledge questions. The information 
on which the first question is based was found on an infographic produced from the CNSC (2015). 
Though the first statement is technically ‘True’, it is worth noting that there was a partial meltdown at 
the NRX reactor in 1952 (Lewis, 1953) as well as a fire accident at the NRU reactor in 1958 
(Greenwood, 1959). While it is true that there have been no accidents in over 40 years, there have been 
accidents as recently as 58 years ago. The second question is ‘True’ as well, with the WNA stating that 
about 15% of electricity generated in Canada comes from nuclear (WNA, 2016). The third question 
was adopted from a Saskatchewan nuclear energy attitudes survey conducted by the NPRI (Bourassa 
et al., 2014, p. 4; adopted from McBeth & Oakes, 1996, p. 426). Only this particular question was used 
from the NPRI survey because the other objective knowledge measures were specific to 
Saskatchewan. A correct response to this third question is ‘False’ for two reasons. First, potentially 
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harmful radiation is not a man-made substance. According to the United Nations Environment 
Programme (2016), the greatest exposure of potentially harmful radiation (known as “ionizing”) is 
caused by natural sources from the environment. Second, only one type of radiation produced by 
humans can damage living tissue. There are two types of radiation created by humans: non-ionizing 
(such as transmission signals for TV and radio) and ionizing (such as nuclear energy and medical x-
rays). Only ionizing radiation exposure in large doses causes harm.  
Basic Knowledge Questions 
 
Question 1: There have been no nuclear accidents with environmental or health consequences in over 40 
years of operations in Canada. True 
Question 2: Nuclear power provided electricity in Canada last year. True 
Question 3: Potentially harmful radiation is a man-made substance that only comes from sources such as 
nuclear power facilities and X-ray machines. False 
Figure 7. Basic nuclear energy knowledge questions with correct answers. 
3.5   HYPOTHESES 
The main argument of this thesis is that non-experts will differ in their assessments of risk associated 
with controversial technologies. As such, one broad research question is: Do risk perceptions run across 
cultural lines among Canadians? But since it is unclear whether Canadians risk assessment differences are 
better explained by cultural predispositions or knowledge, a second research question was formulated. 
Namely, in the context of nuclear energy, do cultural worldviews or basic knowledge have more influence on how 
ordinary citizens misfear risk? 
As cultural cognition researchers explain, strong cultural predispositions interfere with 
evaluations of risks by distorting the interpretation of facts that underpin such evaluations. 
Individualists privilege individual interests over that of the group. They believe individuals themselves 
are responsible for securing the conditions that enable human flourishing, emphasizing that such 
activity is free from collective interference or assistance. As such, they are inclined to trust their own 
judgments in matters including risk, and view government regulations to mitigate risk as an 
infringement upon individual autonomy. For this reason, I predict individualists will perceive low risk 
toward all technologies except vaccines, since there is a broad agreement that vaccines are in effect 
forced public health measures. Thus, H1: Those who score high on the ‘individualist’ index will evaluate the risks 
from all technologies except vaccines as significantly lower than the sample average. 
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 Hierarchists value rigid social order and tend to trust authorities. They believe social factors 
such as rights, duties, goods, and offices should be distributed differentially and in accordance with 
established social characteristics (e.g., gender, wealth, lineage, ethnicity). They see the world as ordered 
in terms of authority relations and are comfortable complying with experts in the presence of 
uncertainty. As such, they are inclined to accept the testimony of experts on matters related to the risks 
associated with technologies. I anticipate hierarchists will perceive low risk toward all technologies 
except homeopathic medicine, given it is an unproven technology among experts. Thus, H2: Those who 
score high on the ‘hierarchy’ index will evaluate the risks from all technologies except homeopathic medicine as significantly 
lower than the sample average. 
Communitarians are willing to set aside their individual interests for the benefit of the group. 
They believe collective interests trump individual interests, designating society as responsible for 
providing the conditions necessary for individual flourishing. For some technologies such as GMOs 
and nuclear energy, communitarians can be expected to magnify uncertain consequences beyond 
expert testimony and pressure government to regulate safety on the presumption that there exist high 
perceived risks for large numbers of individuals, including future generations. Thus H3: Those who score 
high on the ‘communitarian’ index will evaluate the risks from GMOs and nuclear energy as significantly higher than the 
sample average. 
Egalitarians value a society free from externally imposed prescriptions. They believe social 
factors such as rights, duties, goods, and offices should be distributed equally, independent from any 
social characteristic. They see the world as a place of equal opportunity for all. For egalitarians, expert 
opinion will not automatically trump the opinions of non-experts especially if the latter are large in 
number or intense in their beliefs. Trusted sources such as loved ones or some media outlets can serve 
as alternatives to experts on matters of risk, and while expert opinion is seldom dismissed, egalitarians 
are disinclined to discount the opinions of fellow citizens. As such, I expect egalitarians will perceive 
technological risks in GMOs and nuclear energy at relatively high levels. Specifically, H4: Those who score 
high on the ‘egalitarian’ index will evaluate the risks from GMOs and nuclear energy as significantly higher than the 
sample average.  
 As public irrationality researchers argue, ordinary citizens’ assessments of risk are often marred 
by cognitive bias. However, those individuals with more subject matter knowledge are more likely than 
their ignorant counterparts to formulate more even-handed assessments of risk. As some cognitive 
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scientists and behavioral economists explain, increased knowledge operates as a kind of constraint on 
cognitive bias, thus enabling individuals to hold temperate risk perceptions even in cases of 
controversy. Thus, H5: Those who score high on the ‘basic nuclear energy knowledge’ question set will evaluate the 
risks from nuclear energy as significantly lower than the sample average.  
As Kahan & Braman (2006) claim, cultural worldviews predicted nuclear energy risk 
perceptions “more powerfully than any other factor, including gender, race, income, education, and 
political ideology” (pg. 156). Since those other factors are known to correlate strongly with risk 
perceptions of nuclear energy, I anticipate that cultural worldviews will be a stronger predictor of 
nuclear risk than basic knowledge. Thus, H6: Cultural values will be more strongly correlated with nuclear energy 
risk perceptions than basic knowledge of nuclear. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
PATTERNS OF RISK PERCEPTIONS AND CULTURAL 
COGNITION 
4.1   RISK PERCEPTIONS 
As shown in Table 1, the mean score of all technologies is listed with the highest domain score in red 
text and the lowest in green. Risk responses for both homeopathic medicine and vaccines are highest 
in the domain of human health and lowest for the environment. For GMOs and nuclear energy, risk 
perceptions for both technologies are much higher toward human health and the environment than 
the economy and society.  
Figure 8 is a graphical representation of risk perceptions for each technology across each 
domain. Homeopathic medicine has a low risk profile in the domains of the environment, the 
economy, and society. However, the domain of human health has a low-moderate risk profile with 
nearly one-quarter (24%) of respondents reporting ‘High Risk’, ‘Very High Risk’, or ‘Extreme Risk’.  
Risk Perceptions 
 Human Health Environment Economy Society 
  M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Homeopathic Medicine 3.41 1.728 2.06 1.390 2.34 1.485 2.85 1.644 
Vaccines 2.32 1.433 1.95 1.278 1.97 1.406 2.06 1.375 
GMOs 4.18 1.921 4.43 1.880 3.51 1.880 3.85 1.861 
Nuclear Energy 4.16 1.775 4.48 1.708 3.20 1.790 3.67 1.804 
Table 1. Risk perception means and standard deviations for four technologies across four domains. 
Note. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. Risk perception scores ranges from 1 (No Risk At All) to 7 
(Extreme Risk). 
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Figure 8. Percentage of reported risk perceptions for homeopathic medicine, vaccines, GMOs, and nuclear 
energy. 
 
Vaccines have a low risk profile across all domains. Notably, only 8% of respondents reported 
‘High Risk’, ‘Very High Risk’ and ‘Extreme Risk’ toward human health, the domain with the highest 
mean score for vaccine technology. 
Relative to homeopathic medicine and vaccines, GMOs have a high risk profile. In total, 48% 
of the respondents in the domain of the environment and 43% in the domain of human health 
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reported ‘High Risk’, ‘Very High Risk’, or ‘Extreme Risk’. By contrast, fewer participants reported 
these same high risk scores for GMOs in the domains of the economy (27%) and society (36%).  
Like GMOs, nuclear energy has a high risk profile in the domains of the environment and 
human health. Nearly half of the respondents (48%) perceived ‘High Risk’, ‘Very High Risk’, or 
‘Extreme Risk’ in the domain of the environment. In the domain of human health 40% of respondents 
reported the same high risk scores. By contrast, those same risk scores were reported less frequently, 
with 27% in the domain of the economy and 31% in the domain of society.   
Worth highlighting is the similar risk profile shared between homeopathic medicine and 
vaccines, on the one hand, and GMOs and nuclear, on the other. Both Table 1 and Figure 8 show that 
human health predominates homeopathic medicine and vaccines risk perceptions, while human health 
and the environment predominate GMOs and nuclear energy. 
Shown below in Figure 9 are risk perceptions for each technology when all of the domains 
(human health, environment, economy, and society) are combined. Domains were combined to 
compare the overall risk perception between technologies to determine which are the most likely to 
indicate misfearing. The original purpose behind creating domains was to identify possible nuance; but 
since there are no particular domains which stand as outliers from the others, there is therefore no 
reason to not combine all domains for each technology.  
When domain scores are combined there is a clear similarity of overall risk profiles for 
homeopathic medicine and vaccines on the one hand, and GMOs and nuclear energy on the other. 
However, the standard deviations suggest more agreement in the assessment of the former, and less 
agreement on the latter. This takeaway point is that misfearing is more likely to occur toward GMO 
and nuclear energy technologies than homeopathic medicine and vaccines.  
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Combined Domain Score 
 
 GMOs Nuclear Energy Homeopathic Medicine Vaccines 
M 3.99 3.88 2.67 2.07 
SD 1.728 1.619 1.327 1.243 
 
Figure 9. Risk perception for each technology with combined domains. 
4.2   CULTURAL VALUES 
Shown in Figure 10 are the responses to the cultural worldview scale. Recall that egalitarian and 
hierarchical worldviews are opposites on the dimension identified as ‘grid’ and communitarian and 
individualist are opposites on the ‘group’ dimension. On the grid spectrum, respondents agreed more 
strongly with egalitarian scale items than hierarchical. The group spectrum, however, is much more 
evenly split with at least 40% of participants reporting the middle values of ‘Slightly Disagree’ or 
‘Slightly Agree’ for each communitarian or individualist scale item. 
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 EDESCRIM EWEALTH ERADEQ HREVDIS2 HRFEMININ HREQUAL 
M 4.58 4.54 4.71 3.08 2.78 2.84 
SD 1.421 1.503 1.481 1.849 1.734 1.745 
  
 CLIMCHOI CHARM CPROTECT IPROTECT IINTRSTS IPRIVACY 
M 3.18 4.20 3.06 3.65 3.65 4.09 
SD 1.526 1.360 1.495 1.501 1.500 1.452 
 
Figure 10. Cultural Cognition Scale (Dragojlovic & Einseidel Version). 
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Shown in Figure 11 are the grid and group dimension scores. These scores were computed by 
first adding together the level of agreement for each cultural scale item (3 items with a 0-5 score, 
outlined in Figure 10) to create a combined score for each worldview (0-15 score). Since egalitarian-
hierarchical are opposites on the same grid dimension, as too are individualist-communitarian on the 
group dimension, then one score on each dimension was reverse scored to create separation (0-(-15) 
score). This is why ‘egalitarian’ and ‘individualist’ scores scale toward -15. Finally, the difference 
between the worldview values ((-15)-15 score) were calculated to locate respondents on each group-
grid continuum. For example, an individual scoring 7 on hierarchical and -9 on egalitarian would be at 
-2 on the grid continuum. Thus, Figure 11 shows where respondents fall along group and grid lines.  
 
Figure 11. Cultural values scored along ‘grid’ and ‘group’ dimensions. 
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It is important to highlight that the values located on the outer edges of the bar charts (i.e. -15 
& 15) indicate not just strong agreement with a particular worldview, but strong agreement with a 
particular worldview and strong disagreement with the opposing worldview. For example, scoring -15 
on the grid dimension means strong agreement with all egalitarian scale items and strong disagreement 
with all hierarchical items. The results emphasize the strong egalitarian leaning of the sample’s grid 
values compared with the more normal distribution of their group values. Figure 11 also shows how 
few participants identify strongly with hierarchical, individualist, and communitarian values. 
A scatterplot, shown in Figure 12, was created to visualize the distribution of respondents 
across cultural lines. Each point represents at least one participant at an x, y cultural value coordinate 
with larger points representing more than one. The ‘x’ coordinate represents where an individual 
scored on the group dimension and the ‘y’ coordinate represents that same individuals’ grid value. For 
example, a score of 7 on Communitarian and 7 on Individualist would be a ‘0’ group score, and would 
be 0 on the x-axis. A score of -15 on Egalitarian and 2 on Hierarchical would be a ‘-13’ grid score, and 
as such -13 on the y-axis. Taken together, this score – high on Egalitarian values in the group scale and 
equally split on grid values – would therefore be located at ‘0, -13’. This scatterplot is for visualizing 
the distribution of respondents across cultural lines only; analysis looking at combinations of 
worldviews falls outside the scope of the present analysis and skill of the researcher. 
 
Figure 12.Combined grid and group scores plotted on the cultural worldview framework. 
 
42 
4.3   BASIC KNOWLEDGE 
Shown below in Figure 13 are the results from the nuclear energy basic knowledge scale developed 
specifically for the present study. The results show that most participants responded correctly to each 
of the three individual T/F questions (68%, 91%, and 85%). When the scores were added together, 
38% of respondents’ correctly answered all 3 questions, 26% correctly answered two questions, 6% 
correctly answered one question, and 1% correctly answered none of the questions.  
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 SCORE 
M 0.68 0.91 0.85 2.44 
SD 0.465 0.289 0.358 0.683 
Figure 13. Basic knowledge questions and score. 
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CHAPTER V. 
CULTURAL VALUES AND BASIC KNOWLEDGE: 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS  
5.1   CULTURAL WORLDVIEWS AND CONTROVERSIAL TECHNOLOGIES 
The broad research question set out in this project is to examine the relationship between risk 
perceptions and cultural values to identify if estimates of risk run along cultural lines. One key finding 
from the Results Chapter was that mean risk perceptions, and accompanying standard deviations, were 
much higher for GMO and nuclear energy than vaccines and homeopathic medicine. This suggests 
that identifying misfearing along cultural lines is more likely to occur in the former than latter 
technologies.  
Shown below in Table 2 are a series of bivariate regressions, with technological risk 
perceptions as the dependent variables and cultural cognition worldviews as the independent variables. 
The first column presents the standardized error and the second column presents standardized 
regression coefficients. Technological risk perception measured using the combined domain scores 
from section 3.2 (see Figure 9); the cultural cognition worldviews measured using the 0-15 scores from 
section 3.3 (see Figures 10 & 11). Both scores were used for the regression analysis.  
Individualists, as predicted, have lower than sample mean levels of risk perceptions toward all 
technologies except vaccines. Individualists privilege individual over collective interests, are averse to 
collective interference, and are inclined to trust their own judgments in matters involving risk. 
According to the theory put forward in this thesis, individualists are motivated to reject technological 
risk claims as long as doing so does not interfere with individual interests. This conjecture fits with the 
results in Table 2 insofar as individualists otherwise low-risk attitude flip toward high-risk in the case 
of vaccines. Individualists perceive high risk towards vaccines, not necessarily because vaccines are 
risky technologies, but because individualists anticipate that if vaccines are indeed low-risk then 
mandatory vaccination programs would follow – a clear interference disruptive to individual 
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autonomy. Individualists misfearing vaccines and no other technologies supports Hypothesis 1 that 
they do so in a way that reinforces and reflects their preexisting values. 
Hierarchicals had lower than average levels of risk perceptions toward nuclear and GMOs. 
This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, high risk perceptions toward vaccines and low 
risk assessments of homeopathic medicine are both counter to what was hypothesized. According to 
cultural theory, hierarchicals value social order and tend to trust authorities. As such, they should be 
expected to comply with expert opinion on matters of risk and should not misfear technologies which 
experts deem safe. This conjecture fits with the results found for GMOs and nuclear energy, but not 
for vaccines and homeopathic medicine. 
Bivariate Regression for Cultural Cognition Variables Predicting Risk Perceptions (N = 575) 
 
Variable 
 
SE B 
 
β 
Nuclear   
     Individualist  0.01 -.07 
     Communitarian 0.01 .02 
     Hierarchical 0.01  -.22*** 
     Egalitarian 0.01 .25*** 
GMOs   
     Individualist 0.01 -.02 
     Communitarian 0.02 .03 
     Hierarchical 0.01 -.11* 
     Egalitarian 0.01 .23*** 
Vaccines   
     Individualist 0.01 .15*** 
     Communitarian 0.01 -.04 
     Hierarchical 0.01 .11* 
     Egalitarian 0.01 .00 
Hom. Med.   
     Individualist 0.01 -.06 
     Communitarian 0.01 .17*** 
     Hierarchical 0.01 -.00 
     Egalitarian 0.01 .00 
Table 2. Note: * p < .10.  **p  <  .05.  ***p  <  .01. 
It is not clear why hierarchicals in the sample misfear vaccines, a technology promoted as safe 
by medical experts, and fail to misfear homeopathic medicine, a technology which medical experts 
tend to warn is an ineffective substitute for proper medical care. One possibility is that if an individual 
holds both hierarchical and individualist values, their individualist values may override their hierarchical 
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values. This very well may be the case for vaccines; however, this point will remain speculative as 
examining combinations of cultural values falls outside the scope of this analysis. In the case of 
homeopathic medicine, it could be that hierarchicals, like experts, perceive very little risk toward 
homeopathic medicine because they simply do not think it is effective. If it is not effective at treating 
illness (no benefit), then how could it effectively cause harm (no risk)? When creating the original 
hypothesis that hierarchicals would perceive high risk toward homeopathic medicine because medical 
experts view it as a poor substitute for proven medicine, applying Occam’s razor would have helped 
with the hypothesis formulation: hierarchicals, like experts, perceive homeopathic medicine as low risk 
because it is ineffective, both at treating and causing illness. 
Communitarians did not evaluate the risks from GMOs and nuclear energy as significantly 
higher than the sample average. This result is contrary to Hypothesis 3. According to cultural theory, 
communitarians believe collective interests outweigh individual ones. Further, communitarians tend to 
promote collective interference if it promotes individual flourishing (i.e. pressuring government to take 
action when there are perceived risks for large numbers of individuals). Thus, since GMOs and nuclear 
energy technologies pose uncertainties for the safety of present and future generations, 
communitarians were hypothesized to magnify the risks from these technologies relative to the sample 
average. However, this hypothesis was wrong. 
One possibility for why communitarians fail to misfear GMOs is because it is a fairly recent 
technology and as such has not had enough time to mature into a controversial technology. While 
plausible, the fact that communitarians failed to misfear nuclear energy (a mature technology that has 
been controversial for decades) undermines this speculation. Whatever is driving communitarian risk 
perceptions towards GMOs and nuclear energy, they appear content with both the safety and existing 
regulations of these two technologies. Admittedly, this result was puzzling. Yet even more puzzling is 
why communitarians perceived significantly higher levels of risk than the sample average toward 
homeopathic medicine. While the relatively small numbers of individuals who identify strongly as 
communitarians may be part of the problem, these unexpected results nonetheless suggest that the 
theoretical work describing those who hold communitarian values may be in need of refinement for 
the Canadian context.   
Finally, egalitarians, as predicted in Hypothesis 4, have higher than the sample average risk 
perceptions toward GMOs and nuclear energy. Those with strong egalitarian values believe that 
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society should be a place of equal opportunity for all regardless of externally imposed prescriptions, 
and regardless of factors such as race, wealth, and gender, etc. These predispositions support the 
argument that, for egalitarians, expert opinion does not automatically trump non-expert opinions. As a 
result, trusted sources can serve as alternatives to experts on risk, which appears to be the case for 
GMOs and nuclear energy. Yet egalitarians and expert opinion are not consistently at odds. This is 
evident by egalitarians moderate risk perceptions toward vaccines and homeopathic medicine.  
Outlined above is evidence that individuals perceive risk across cultural lines. In sum, 
misfearing occurs among both individualists and hierarchicals who perceive higher than the sample 
average risk perceptions toward vaccines. Egalitarians misfear both GMOs and nuclear energy. 
Similarly, communitarians misfear homeopathic medicine. Thus, there is some evidence that 
individualists and egalitarians do perceive risk across cultural lines in predicted ways, and that 
hierarchical and communitarians perceive risk across cultural lines but in unpredicted ways. 
5.2   CULTURAL VALUES AND BASIC KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
NUCLEAR ENERGY 
A more specific research question was developed to test the claims of CCT and PIT in the context of 
nuclear energy. That is, to compare how cultural values affect nuclear risk perceptions with how basic 
knowledge of nuclear energy affects perceptions of nuclear risk. The ultimate aim of this analysis is to 
determine whether basic knowledge or cultural values matter more for misfearing nuclear energy. 
Figure 14 shows nuclear risk perceptions for each cultural worldview. Consistent with what was 
predicted, both Figure 14 and Table 2 show that individualists and hierarchicals have relatively lower 
levels of risk perceptions than egalitarians and communitarians who are statistically significantly more 
likely to believe that nuclear power constitutes a serious risk. This finding is consistent with other 
findings from previous CCT research (see section 1.9 for discussion). 
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Figure 14. Nuclear energy risk perceptions across cultural lines. 
Interestingly, nuclear risk perceptions differ across the grid-group continuums with the difference 
much more pronounced for grid (egalitarian-hierarchical) than group (individualist-communitarian). 
The group regression results are difficult to interpret given the similarity between individualists and 
communitarians standardized beta scores for nuclear energy risk, and given the puzzling 
communitarian sample results in general. As such, group results will be discarded for the remainder of 
the analysis. 
For the grid regression results, the standardized beta score is lower than the hierarchical score. 
Recall that the grid variable is a calculated value representing the difference between hierarchical-
egalitarian values on the same continuum ((-15)-15 score). As such, the grid variable balances out the 
contrasting hierarchical-egalitarian values. The unexpected but interesting low standardized beta score 
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suggests that those who hold moderate grid cultural values have lower than average nuclear risk 
perceptions, lower than even the hierarchical scale.  
Bivariate Regression for Grid & Group Variables Predicting Nuclear Energy Risk Perceptions (N = 575) 
 
Variable 
 
B 
 
SE B 
 
β 
Grid (Ega-Hie)  -0.05  0.00 -.26*** 
Group (Ind-Com) 0.01 0.01 .06 
Hierarchical *add* 0.01  -.22*** 
Note:  
Table 3. * p < .10.  **p  <  .05.  ***p  <  .01. 
Looking at basic knowledge, Table 4 shows that Q1 and Q2 had the same standardized beta 
scores. But even though these scores were identical, answering Q2 correct had a bigger effect on 
nuclear risk perceptions as indicated by the non-standardized scores. As such, one explanation for the 
larger error for Q2 could be the result of it being a question unrelated to risk (requiring participants to 
know that nuclear power provided electricity in Canada last year) versus Q1 being slightly more risk-
focused (requiring participants to know that there have been zero nuclear accidents with 
environmental or health consequences in over 40 years in Canada). Furthermore, Q1 may have caused 
some individuals to experience cognitive dissonance. Believing that nuclear energy is risky and knowing 
that there have been no major accidents in 40 years are conflicting propositions. The risk focus and 
cognitive dissonance involved in Q1 may explain why it was incorrectly answered by almost a third 
(32%) of respondents, and why it has a lower standard error for predicting nuclear risk perceptions.  
Compared to Q1 and Q2, Q3 is an outlier. It appears as though knowing that harmful 
radiation is not a man-made substance does not affect nuclear risk perceptions as much as answering 
correctly Q1 or Q2. This result suggests participants with basic knowledge about radiation may have 
other risk concerns about nuclear energy than its radioactivity. 
Bivariate Regression for Basic Knowledge Variables Predicting Nuclear Energy Risk Perceptions (N = 402) 
 
Variable 
 
B 
 
SE B 
 
β 
Q1_correct  -0.83  0.16 -.23*** 
Q2_correct -1.33 0.27 -.23*** 
Q3_correct -0.64 0.22 -.14** 
Basic Knowledge -0.80 0.11 -.34*** 
Note: The correct response was coded as ‘1’ and the incorrect response as ‘0’; BasicKnowledge is the total 
score (0-3) calculated for each participant. 
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Table 4. * p < .10.  **p  <  .05.  ***p  <  .01. 
A key finding from the previous Chapter was that less than 4 out of 10 participants answered 
all 3 basic T/F question correctly. The BasicKnowledge variable is a variable which calculated the total 
number of correct responses for each participant. BasicKnowledge had both the highest standardized 
beta and smallest error relative to any individual question. This result affirms hypothesis 5, indicating 
that there is a strong negative correlation between basic knowledge and nuclear energy risk 
perceptions. Namely, as basic knowledge about nuclear energy increases, risk perceptions toward 
nuclear energy decreases. 
5.3   MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION 
Table 5 presents the multivariate regression results for Models 1 through 5. All models used nuclear 
energy risk perceptions as the dependent variable and all models used ordinary least squares as the 
method for analysis. The coefficients reported are standardized Betas with corresponding standard 
errors. 
A multivariate model was constructed to determine, first, whether basic knowledge or cultural 
values matter more for nuclear energy risk perceptions and, second, whether other variables, 
prominent in previous research, continued to exert influence. To that end, Models 2 through 5 use the 
BasicKnowledge score (described in section 3.4) as a variable of interest for measuring basic 
knowledge of nuclear power while Models 3 through 5 use grid and egalitarian variables (described in 
section 3.3) for measuring cultural values. Models 1 through 4 are additive while Model 5 uses one 
interaction term to estimate the combined effects of basic knowledge and egalitarian cultural values. 
Gender, political preference, and education were used as control variables. As discussed in 
section 1.4, previous studies have shown that gender and political worldviews are strongly correlated 
with risk assessments (Slovic, 1999). Men assess risks as both smaller and less problematic than 
women (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz 2007) and politically 
left-of-centre respondents have much stronger nuclear energy risk concerns than their right-of-centre 
counterparts (Franchino, 2014). Education was also used as a control but not as a variable of interest 
because, as discussed at the end of section 1.6, evidence suggests that level of education is independent 
from understanding risk (Kahan & Braman, 2006). However, education is being used as a control 
given that it could have an effect on other independent variables.  
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For the multivariate regression analysis, the Female variable was coded ‘0’ for male and ‘1’ for 
female. The Education variable was coded from ‘0’ to ‘9’ with 0 as ‘Some high school’ or lowest level of 
education and 9 as ‘Doctoral degree’ or highest level of education. Responses between 0 and 9 are 
consistent with the available selections from which participants chose during the survey (see Appendix 
D for full list). Finally, Left was coded ‘0’ for Conservative, ‘1’ for Liberal, ‘2’ for NDP, and ‘3’ for 
Green to create a progressive political dimension, with 0 being most politically right-of-centre and 3 
being most politically left-of-centre. 
Multivariate Regression for Independent Variables Predicting Nuclear Energy Risk Perceptions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dependent 
Nuclear 
Risk 
Nuclear 
Risk 
Nuclear 
Risk 
Nuclear 
Risk 
Nuclear 
Risk 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Female 
0.13* 0.10* 0.07  0.08* 
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16)  (0.16) 
Education 
-0.03 0.00 -0.02   
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)   
Left 
0.31*** 0.29*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.23*** 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10) 
BasicKnowledge 
 -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.42*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) 
Grid (Ega-Hie) 
  -0.20*** -0.21***  
  (0.01) (0.01)  
Interaction (Ega X 
BasicKnowledge) 
    0.16** 
    (0.00) 
N 
Adjusted R
2
 
323 322 322 330 330 
.10 .21 .23 .23 .21 
F 13.691 21.829 20.586 33.887 23.640 
Table 5. Standard error in parentheses; legend: * p < .10.  **p  <  .05.  ***p  <  .01. 
 As expected, and consistent with previous research, Left was strongly correlated with 
heightened nuclear energy risk perceptions. This result was found across Models 1 through 5. 
Regardless of the effects of other variables, the more progressive a respondent, the more likely he or 
she is to perceive a high risk associated with nuclear energy. These results are robust across a number 
of specifications. The effect of gender breaks down once basic knowledge and cultural values are 
added to the equations, but reemerge when cultural values focus specifically on egalitarian cultural 
values. Overall, women may be more inclined to fear nuclear energy, but as Model 3 illustrates, this 
effect is likely attributable to the fact that women are more politically progressive (as defined here). A 
higher (or lower) level of education has no effect on nuclear risk perceptions and the values of other 
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coefficients remain stable across specifications. This result is important because it suggests that nuclear 
misfearing is not a function of education. As we will see is that it is specific knowledge, not general 
education, that matters.  
In Model 2 BasicKnowledge was added to the set of control variables. Model 2 shows that 
BasicKnowledge has a negative and statistically significant effect on Nuclear Risk. The more basic nuclear 
energy knowledge respondents exhibit, the more likely they are to offer lower estimates of nuclear risk.  
Adding Grid to the specification in Models 3 and 4 shows that cultural lens is important for risk 
assessment.  As grid scores increase (meaning as respondents evince an increasing preference for 
hierarchical values rather than egalitarian ones), the tendency to see nuclear energy as risky declines. 
Relative to Model 2, the addition of Grid values reduced both the statistical significance of Female and 
the standardized beta score for Left. Interestingly, the coefficient on BasicKnowledge is virtually 
unchanged between Models 2 and 4. 
In Model 4, Female and Education control variables were removed due to lack of statistical 
significance while Left, BasicKnowledge, and Grid remain in the analysis. This leads to a substantial 
increase in the F score of Model 4 relative to Model 3. Model 4 shows that all the variables in the 
Model are statistically significant predictors of nuclear energy risk. Similar to previous models, Left has 
a positive and statistically significant effect on nuclear energy risk perceptions and the two variables of 
interest, BasicKnowledge and Grid, have a negative and statistically significant effect on nuclear energy 
risk perceptions. In other words, those who lean politically left tend to perceive heightened risk 
perceptions towards nuclear. Further, regarding the two variables of interest, those with increased 
basic knowledge and those with more hierarchical values tend to perceive lower levels of risk towards 
nuclear energy.  
While both BasicKnowledge and Grid are statistically significant in Model 4, the standardized beta 
score for Grid values are lower than BasicKnowledge. As the values of these two variables increase, the 
effect on risk perceptions is greater for BasicKnowledge. This finding suggests that we should reject 
Hypothesis 6 regarding the relative importance of cultural variables. It is important not to place too 
much emphasis on this finding, however, since the differences are small. What they suggest is that 
while cultural values influence risk perceptions, basic knowledge is a strong and independent predictor 
independent from the cultural lens one employs.  
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It is possible, of course, that those who hold more egalitarian values will be inclined to 
continue misfearing nuclear energy despite having more knowledge. In this case, egalitarian values 
would override basic knowledge. Model 5 maintains political preference as a control, reintroduces 
gender as a control variable, and introduces an interaction variable to capture the potential effects of 
combining egalitarian values and basic knowledge. Since egalitarian cultural values are positively 
correlated with nuclear energy risk (see Table 2), and since Models 2 through 4 show the strength of 
basic knowledge, an interaction variable was created to measure how egalitarian values interact with 
basic knowledge.  
Model 5 shows that, after controlling for political preference and gender, the BasicKnowledge 
coefficient increased relative to other models. Model 5 also shows that the interaction between 
egalitarian and basic knowledge is positively correlated with nuclear risk perceptions. Those 
respondents who are high of egalitarian values and high on basic knowledge represent a group that is 
unusually conscious of nuclear risk. Consistent with previous models BasicKnowledge appears to be a 
strong predictor of risk perceptions; however, the interaction suggests that those with more egalitarian 
values increase their fear levels even as basic knowledge increases. 
5.4   LIMITATIONS 
5.4.1   Risk Scale 
One limitation of this study is locating where expert risk perceptions are or where evidence suggests 
risk perceptions should be. A benchmark value would take the form of telling respondents where 
experts assume the overall risk to be. By not setting a benchmark risk perception value (i.e. overall 
nuclear energy risk perceptions should be ‘Slight Risk (3)’ on the risk perception scale) all technologies 
used were presumed to be low-risk. But ‘low-risk’ is a vague and non-specific attribute. A benchmark 
value would have clarified this vagueness, and further, would have identified those participants whose 
risk estimates were higher than the benchmark value. In turn, risk perceptions greater than the 
benchmark value could then be said to be overestimates of risk. This study used overestimate relative 
to the sample average because, other than ostensibly setting an expert score, additional information 
would have been required to reliably locate an expert score. But using the sample average as the 
benchmark value is not the best approach. 
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A second limitation with the risk scale design was the response ‘No Risk At All’. When 
participants rated a technology as posing ‘No Risk At All’ it was unclear whether their response 
indicated that they believed the technology poses zero risk or if the benefits outweighed the risks. The 
latter interpretation may have confounded results, as risk perception research suggests that risk and 
benefit are negatively correlated. That is, when an individual assesses a hazard, perceived risk is lower if 
perceived benefit is greater, and vice versa (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). Therefore, 
broadening the scale (i.e. ‘Extreme Benefit – Extreme Risk’) would aid in discerning between whether 
‘No Risk At All’ means zero risk or some risk but outweighed by benefits. 
More than clarifying a ‘No Risk At All’ response, the present research project would have been 
improved by using a benefit and risk scale to observe the other side of the misfearing coin. Namely, to 
identify those who underestimate serious risks. Future research into the problem of misfearing should 
use a benefit-and-risk scale rather than a risk-only scale in order to fully observe the relationship 
between misfearing proper8 and independent variables of interest.  
One broad suggestion to improve risk perception research is for researchers in this area to 
develop a standardized risk scale. Not having a standardized scale means that it is not meaningful to 
compare different risk perception results from different studies and samples. If instead both the 
present study and a separate study examined nuclear energy risk perceptions using the same risk scale, 
it would allow for meaningful comparisons to detect spatio-temporal differences.  
5.4.2   Cultural Values 
Not knowing the extent to which grid values influence group values, or vice versa, is a limitation of the 
cultural worldview methodology. As shown on the cultural cognition worldviews scatterplot (Figure 
12), each respondent has a grid and group score. Having two scores is problematic because grid and 
group values can interact with one another in undetectable ways. For example, if an individual scored 
high on both ‘hierarchical’ (grid value) and ‘individualist’ (group value), it is difficult to determine 
which cultural worldview is responsible for, say, vaccine risk perceptions. In fact, this limitation may 
have confounded the results for hierarchicals risk perceptions towards vaccines which were 
unexpectedly high. 
                                                 
8 Mistaking low-risk as high-risk and mistaking high-risk as low-risk 
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Second, the CCT scale itself has some limitations in the Canadian context. Results for 
communitarians were quite puzzling because, contrary to both what was predicted and stated in 
previous research, this worldview failed to drive overestimates of GMO and nuclear energy risk. To be 
fair, the puzzling results for communitarians were not entirely unexpected. Lachapelle, Montpetit & 
Gauvin (2014) removed communitarians from analysis in their study citing the “relatively 
unsatisfactory reliability scores” to be a function of “cultural cleavages in Quebec [which] are not 
reducible to two continuums” (p. 684). But one possible factor confounding the communitarian results 
in Canada is that the group scale items (see 2.4.2) all ask participants to rate their level of agreement 
with statements describing government activity. As such, being communitarian or being individualist is 
predicated on how respondents’ perceive government should function, ranging from heavy 
involvement in individual affairs to virtually no involvement.  
Yet in Canada government interference is fairly moderate because the political spectrum is 
fairly moderate. Relative to the United States, the region in which the cultural cognition worldview 
scale was developed and validated, Canadian political parties tend to disagree about government 
activity in a narrower range than between communitarian-individualist extremes. Such moderation may 
be what was captured in the grid results (3.2) where nearly half (40%) of participants reported middle 
values of ‘Slightly Disagree’ or ‘Slightly Agree’ for each of the six scale items. As such, replacing 
questions about government interference with other questions designed to appeal to individualist and 
communitarian Canadians could provide more meaningful results for group scale items in Canada. 
5.4.3   Basic Knowledge 
One limitation of the basic knowledge scale is that responses were only acquired for nuclear energy. 
To be fair, this study was intended to focus on nuclear energy specifically. However, additional 
knowledge questions would have provided a point of comparison. Without basic knowledge questions 
for other technologies, the only conclusion that can be drawn from basic knowledge results is that it 
does reduce risk overestimates towards nuclear specifically.  
 A second limitation is the reliability of Q2 which asks “True or False: There have been no 
nuclear accidents with environmental or health consequences in over 40 years of operations in 
Canada.” This question is problematic in two ways. First, it did not specifically state nuclear energy. 
Since nuclear could refer to nuclear research reactors, nuclear medicine, nuclear waste, etc., clarifying 
nuclear energy would have improved the reliability of this question. Second, replacing “in over 40 years 
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of operation” with “in the past 40 years of operation” would have ruled out the possibility that some 
individuals with advanced nuclear energy knowledge would be correct in answering False. They would 
be correct because of a partial meltdown at the NRX reactor in 1952 and fire accident at the NRU 
reactor in 1958, both of which likely had some degree of environmental or health consequence. While 
neither of these problems was considered limiting enough to remove the question from analysis, 
carelessly constructing a knowledge-based question challenges the reliability of results for this question.  
Finally, it is not clear how to methodologically turn PIT into a testable hypothesis because it is 
unclear how to measure cognitive bias when participants are assessing information. The present study 
opted to use basic knowledge as a measure. At minimum, this approach meant that participants with 
basic knowledge were not irrational precisely because their risk perceptions were consistent with those 
produced from experts who presumably arrived at their risk perceptions free from bias. Though the 
common denominator is ‘knowledge’, the inference that both are free from cognitive bias requires 
granting some logical flexibility. Whether respondents with higher basic knowledge are parroting risk 
beliefs or whether respondents with higher basic knowledge comprehend the evidence without bias 
like experts remains unclear. Therefore, developing a valid measurement to turn PIT into a testable 
hypothesis would allow for improved collection of evidence to test its claims.  
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CONCLUSION 
6.1   STUDY SUMMARY 
This thesis aimed to understand how and why individuals mistake low-risk technology as high-risk. 
While it is true that individuals accept expert risk precautions most of the time, in a slim number of 
cases individuals form their own assessments independent from experts. Two theoretical explanations 
for these infrequent cleavages are, first, PIT which asserts that bias and emotions cause individuals to 
arrive at inaccurate assessments of risk; and second, CCT which asserts that individuals are motivated 
to perceive risk along cultural lines. The present thesis turned these two claims into testable hypotheses 
to answer two research questions. One research question investigated the extent to which public risk 
perceptions are a function of pre-existing cultural values. Another more specific research question 
examined whether cultural values or public irrationality is a stronger predictor of misfearing in the 
context of nuclear energy.  
Arguments for motivated reasoning and pre-existing values influencing technological risk 
perceptions are compelling. The idea that risk assessments are motivated by partisan rather than 
accuracy goals explains how and why risk assessments are biased by worldviews. Yet more than mere 
conjecture, results from the present survey study provide some evidence that cultural values do indeed 
affect risk perceptions across cultural lines. Just as sports fans and political party loyalists are 
predictably biased in their interpretations of information, so too are individualists who perceive 
heightened risk towards vaccines, and egalitarians who perceive heightened risk towards both GMOs 
and nuclear energy. These cultural value and risk perception relationships were predicted, are 
consistent with cultural theory, and are consistent with CCT research.  
Caution must be taken before overstating the significance of cultural values affecting risk 
perceptions. The expected results were also mixed with two unexpected yet statistically significant 
relationships between cultural values and heightened risk perceptions. Results that communitarians 
misfear homeopathic medicine and hierarchicals misfear vaccines are puzzling because these 
relationships were not predicted, are not consistent with cultural theory, and are not consistent with 
CCT research. However, since this survey study is only the second cross-Canada study to use the CCT 
worldview scale and the first to examine homeopathic medicine and vaccines, it is unclear whether 
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such unexpected results were due to an error in the sample or constitute a new finding in the Canadian 
context. More research is needed with cultural values and risk perceptions in Canada to verify these 
findings for communitarians and hierarchicals. 
In the context of nuclear energy, results in the present study found that grid values (egalitarian-
hierarchical) were statistically significant predictors of nuclear risk perceptions whereas group values 
(individualist-communitarian) were not. Yet the predictive strength of grid values relative to basic 
knowledge was not as strong. Moreover, when an interaction between basic knowledge and egalitarian 
values was analyzed, basic knowledge became an even stronger predictor of nuclear energy risk 
perceptions. Such results support PIT, which claims that citizens who mistake low-risk technology as 
high-risk do so because they fail to assess risk methodically and rigorously like experts. The theory in 
conjunction with the findings in this study supports the conjecture that public irrationality significantly 
affects nuclear energy risk perceptions. 
What is unclear is how public irrationality strongly affects nuclear energy risk. The effort 
undertaken in the present study was to turn PIT into a testable hypothesis by assessing basic 
knowledge. Basic facts were used as a proxy for irrationality because it is unknown to the researcher 
how else one might measure irrationality. However, knowing basic facts about nuclear energy is not 
the best measure of irrationality because knowing facts is dissimilar from the process experts undergo 
when formulating their assessments. As such, basic knowledge is clearly not an adequate substitute for 
testing irrationality. Yet if the definition of rationality is conforming one’s beliefs with reasons to 
believe, then some individuals may be motivated to conform their beliefs with goals other than 
accuracy (see section 2.6). Thus, it is perfectly rational for individuals to misfear nuclear energy (their 
beliefs) if their trusted sources of information purport to have facts reinforcing claims that nuclear is 
dangerous (their reasons to believe). Of course that is not what PIT argues, arguing instead that 
citizens’ views are rational when aligned with expert’s accurate views, which makes defining and testing 
cases of irrationality rather puzzling. 
The main problem with testing basic knowledge is that it is unclear how simply knowing basic 
facts causes individuals to assess nuclear risk like experts. It may be that individuals who accept expert 
facts about nuclear energy do so because they also accept expert views of virtually all matters of risk. 
Or equally plausible is that knowing facts which indicate nuclear is not dangerous directly contradicts 
any belief that nuclear energy is unsafe. Thus, while evidence suggests that even simple basic 
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knowledge of nuclear energy reduces inaccurate overestimates of nuclear risk, it is not clear how 
individuals with increased basic knowledge arrive at lower risk perceptions. More research is needed 
with public irrationality to improve its testability for empirical study and more research is needed into 
how basic knowledge appears to bridge the gulf between public and expert views on matters of risk. 
6.2  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The basic knowledge and cultural value results gathered in this study offer three insights into why most 
Canadians perceive nuclear energy as dangerous. First, basic knowledge results suggest that increasing 
nuclear energy knowledge decreases nuclear energy misfearing. The present study has shown that the 
kind of knowledge required to eliminate nuclear misfearing is remarkably basic. As such, it may be the 
case that most Canadians perceive nuclear energy as dangerous because most do not comprehend 
basic facts about nuclear energy. Second, egalitarian values influenced individuals in the study sample 
to perceive nuclear as high risk. If egalitarian values resonate as strongly with Canadians as they do 
with participants in the present study, then egalitarian values may also be responsible for most 
Canadians perceiving nuclear energy as dangerous. Third, those with progressive political views also 
appear to misfear nuclear energy. Thus, public ignorance about nuclear energy, strong adherence to 
egalitarian values, and being politically progressive may be three factors driving Canadians to fear 
nuclear energy. From these observations, two policy recommendations emerge. 
6.2.1   Let the global nuclear renaissance pass Canada 
Regardless of the aspirational technological developments of nuclear energy (such as small modular 
reactors) any Canadian governments contemplating nuclear energy as part of an energy mix will face 
difficulties developing nuclear as part of their energy mix. Despite an upward trend in new builds 
around the world, a nuclear renaissance appears unlikely in Canada because many Canadians perceive 
nuclear energy as a high-risk technology. Those who are politically progressive, who hold egalitarian 
values, and to a lesser extent females are likely to hold opinions that nuclear energy is a dangerous, 
high risk prospect. Importantly, these factors influence the opinions of significant numbers of 
Canadians, not merely fringe groups, which makes the prospects for nuclear energy in Canada bleak. If 
the bottom line is that no nuclear agenda in Canada will be effective unless the public is satisfied on 
matters of safety, then the prospects for domestic nuclear energy development are very low. 
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In a democracy such as Canada, public consultation is necessary. Despite the fact that strong 
negative perceptions of risk towards nuclear energy are inconsistent with facts about consequences to 
human health or the environment, the public continues to appear unconvinced by expert assurance of 
safety. And in a democracy, the perceptions of the many (the public) often outweigh the conclusions 
of the few (experts). Public perceptions may not be determinative, but they slow decision making and 
challenge governments to devise ways of consulting that are not ultimately prejudicial to their energy 
goals. Governments would be wise to observe the public consultation experiences in Saskatchewan 
which demonstrated how public consultation can ultimately derail a nuclear agenda. 
Finally, nuclear energy may be too controversial for any government wishing to remain 
popular among the public. Citizens who oppose nuclear energy tend to be much more outspoken and 
engaged on nuclear energy issues than those who support it. Despite potential to gain support as a low 
carbon emitting energy source in a post Paris Agreement political world attuned to emissions outputs, 
nuclear energy simply lacks the kind of enthusiasm that renewable energy such as solar and wind have. 
Oddly enough, progressives and egalitarians are likely the same individuals who are enthusiastic for 
renewables yet fear nuclear. Therefore, given the lack of a public appetite for nuclear energy in Canada, 
funding and support for future energy mixes appear better spent fueling the growth of renewable 
energy and not nuclear. 
6.2.2   Increase education and improve communication 
If the bottom line is that no nuclear agenda in Canada will be effective unless the public is satisfied on 
matters of safety, then confronting the problem of nuclear energy misfearing is necessary for any 
government wishing to develop nuclear energy. To counteract overestimates of nuclear energy risk, 
education regarding nuclear energy specifically appears to be an effective policy instrument. Education 
is a tool that can increase knowledge about nuclear energy, which according to the results in the 
present study is important because basic knowledge ameliorates overestimates of nuclear energy risk. 
Even simple increases in what citizens know about nuclear energy are likely to have a significant effect 
on clearing away mistaken beliefs which drive fears towards nuclear. 
This thesis has shown, however, that education by itself may not be effective. After examining 
the interaction between egalitarian values and basic knowledge, it was observed that egalitarians 
continue to perceive heightened risk towards nuclear energy even if their basic knowledge increases. 
This means that simply presenting facts about the safety of nuclear may be ineffective at convincing 
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egalitarians that nuclear energy is not dangerous because some individuals may choose to retain facts 
only if those facts reflect or reinforce pre-existing worldviews. As a result, efforts to educate the public 
on nuclear energy may fail to resonate with those individuals whose egalitarian values bias 
interpretations of nuclear energy facts.  
A more effective way of increasing the transmission of nuclear energy facts is to improve the 
way in which risk is communicated. One way to increase the effectiveness of educating the public 
about nuclear energy could be achieved by reducing cultural bias. As cultural theory suggests, 
egalitarians are not automatically swayed by expert opinion, nor are they anti-science as indicated by 
their risk perceptions towards vaccines and homeopathic medicine. Instead, egalitarians are receptive 
to trusted non-expert opinion. To address prohibitive egalitarian values which interfere with the 
transmission of nuclear energy facts, relying on trusted non-expert spokespersons could help with 
increasing the effectiveness of education efforts. For example, trusted public figures like Bill Gates, 
James Hanson, and Stewart Brand are more likely to change egalitarian attitudes towards nuclear than 
more official sources that simply present facts. The key point for this particular strategy is that the 
spokesperson is both trusted by egalitarians and perceives nuclear energy risk consistent with evidence 
from experts.   
The above technique, using spokespersons to infuse cultural values with education, is only one 
of many techniques which could help improve communicating risk when bias clouds assessments. 
Other communication techniques, such as framing information designed to resonate with individuals 
whose values predispose them to mistake low-risk technology as high-risk, could also work on cases in 
which cultural values cause individuals to misfear. Applying cultural theory would aid with improving 
transmission of facts on controversial issues where culture biases interpretations of facts. For example, 
cultural theory suggests individualists trust their own judgment. Framing information about vaccines as 
a self-defence tool against disease, not as a government sponsored program, could change the way in 
which individualists think about vaccines and their attendant risks. Furthermore, successful strategies 
could be adopted and applied to other kinds of factors known to bias fair assessments, such as gender 
and political views. Therefore, investing in education and improving communication techniques could 
help ensure not just that a nuclear agenda becomes a viable option by helping the public to understand 
the safety of nuclear, but also that governments will develop strategies to better manage other topics of 
controversy. 
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APPENDIX B.  CULTURAL COGNITION WORLDVIEW SCALE (MODIFIED SHORT 
FORM)  
A.  Group or Individualism-Communitarianism (reverse code “C” items) 
People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in making decisions for 
themselves.  How strongly you agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, 
moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree] 
1. IINTRSTS.  The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives. 
2. CHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves.  
3. IPROTECT.  It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves.  
4. IPRIVACY.  The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.  
5. CPROTECT.  The government should do more to advance society's goals, even if that means limiting the 
freedom and choices of individuals.   
6. CLIMCHOI.  Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't get in the 
way of what's good for society.   
 
Les gens dansnotresociété ne sont pas souventd'accord sur si on devraitintervenirdans la prise de 
décision de quelqu'und'autre. Indiquezvotreniveaud'accord avec chaquedéclaration. [Tout à fait 
endésaccord, Modérémentendésaccord, Plutôtendésaccord, Plutôtd'accord, Modérément D'accord, 
Tout à fait d'accord] 
 
1. IINTRSTS.  Le gouvernements'ingère trop dansnos vies quotidiennes.  
2. CHARM. Le gouvernementdoitparfoislégiférer pour empêcher les gens de se blesser. 
3. IPROTECT.  Le gouvernementn’a pas le droit d’essayer de protéger les gens contreeux-mêmes. 
4. IPRIVACY.  Le gouvernementdoitcesser de dire aux gens comment ilsdevraient vivre.  
5. CPROTECT.  Le gouvernementdevrait faire davantage pour faire advancer les objectifs de la société, 
mêmesicelasignifie limiter la liberté et les choix des individus.   
6. CLIMCHOI.  Le gouvernementdevrait imposer des limites sur les choix que les individuspeuventavoir de 
sortequ’ilsn’interfère pas avec ce qui estbien pour la société. 
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B. Grid or Hierarchy-Egalitarianism (reverse code “E” items) 
People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and discrimination.  How strongly you 
agree or disagree with each of these statements? [strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly 
disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree] 
1. HEQUAL.  We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.  
2. EWEALTH.  Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal.  
3. ERADEQ.  We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and visible 
minorities9 [people of color], and men and women.  
4. EDISCRIM.  Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.  
5. HREVDIS2.  It seems like ethnic minorities [blacks], women, homosexuals and other groups don't want 
equal rights, they want special rights just for them.  
6. HFEMININ.  Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine 
 
Les gens dansnotresociété ne sont pas souventd'accord sur les problèmesd'égalité et de 
discrimination. Indiquezvotreniveaud'accord avec chaquedéclaration. [Tout à fait endésaccord, 
Modérémentendésaccord, Plutôtendésaccord, Plutôtd'accord, Modérément D'accord, Tout à fait 
d'accord] 
1. HEQUAL.  Nous sommesallés trop loin dans la promotion l’égalité des droitsdansce pays. 
2. EWEALTH.  Notre sociétéseraitmeilleuresi la répartition de la richessea été plus égale. 
3. ERADEQ.  Nous avonsbesoin de réduireconsidérablement les inégalités entre les riches et les pauvres, les 
blancs et les minoritésvisibles, et les hommes et les femmes. 
4. EDISCRIM.  La discrimination contre les minoritésvisiblesreste encore un problèmetrès 
gravedansnotresociété. 
5. HREVDIS2.  Il semble que les minoritésethniques, les femmes, les homosexuels et les autresgroupes ne 
veulent pasl’égalité des droits, maisveulentplutôt des droits spéciauxjuste pour eux. 
6. HFEMININ.  La société,dans son ensemble, estdevenue trop douce et féminine 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Underlined text denotes language used in this study’s scale items, subsequent square brackets denotes language used in the 
CCT short-form worldview scale. 
 
71 
APPENDIX C.  BASIC NUCLEAR ENERGY KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS 
True or false: There have been no nuclear accidents with environmental or health 
consequences in over 40 years of operations in Canada. 
 True 
 False 
Vraiou faux: Il n’y a pas eud’accidents nucléaires avec des conséquences environnementales 
ou de santédepuis 40 ans au Canada. 
 Vrai 
 Faux 
 
True or false: Nuclear power provided electricity in Canada last year. 
 True 
 False 
Vrai ou faux: L'énergie nucléaire a fourni de l'électricité pour le Canada l'année dernière. 
 Vrai 
 Faux 
 
True or false: Potentially harmful radiation is a man-made substance that only comes from 
sources such as nuclear power facilities and X-ray machines. 
 True 
 False 
Vrai ou faux : Le rayonnement potentiellement nocif est provoqué par l'homme et ne vient que 
des sources telles que les centrales nucléaires et les appareils à rayons X. 
 Vrai 
 Faux 
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APPENDIX D.  DEMOGRAPHICS 
QRegion In what Canadian province or territory do you currently 
reside? 
 Alberta 
 British Columbia 
 Manitoba 
 New Brunswick 
 Newfoundland & Labrador 
 Nova Scotia 
 Northwest Territories 
 Nunavut 
 Ontario 
 Prince Edward Island 
 Quebec 
 Saskatchewan 
 Yukon 
 
QRégion Dans quelle province ou territoire canadienne habitez-vous ?  
 Alberta 
 Colombie-Britannique 
 Île-du-Prince-Édouard 
 Manitoba 
 Nouveau-Brunswick 
 Nouvelle-Écosse 
 Nunavut 
 Ontario 
 Québec 
 Saskatchewan 
 Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador 
 Territoires du Nord-Ouest 
 Yukon 
 
QAGE What is your age? 
 18-24 years old 
 25-34 years old 
 35-44 years old 
 45-54 years old 
 55-64 years old 
 65 years or older 
 
QÂGE Quel âge avez-vous ? 
 18 à 24 ans 
 25 à 34 ans 
 35 à 44 ans 
 45 à 54 ans 
 55 à 64 ans 
 65 ans ou plus âgé(e) 
 
QINC What was your total income in 2014? 
 Less than $25,000 
 $25,000 to less than $50,000 
 $50,000 to less than $75,000 
 $75,000 to less than $100,000 
 $100,000 to less than $125,000 
 $125,000 to less than $150,000 
 $150,000 to less than $175,000 
 $175,000 or more 
 Prefer not to say 
 
QINC Qu'est-ce qui était votre revenu total pour l'année 2014 ? 
 Moins de 25 000 $ 
 25 000 $ à moins de 50 000 $ 
 50 000 $ à moins de 75 000 $ 
 75 000 $ à moins de 100 000 $ 
 100 000 $ à moins de 125 000 $ 
 125 000 $ à moins de 150 000 $ 
 150 000 $ à moins de 175 000 $ 
 175 000 $ ou plus 
 Je préfère ne pas dire 
 
QEDU What is the highest degree or level of school you have 
completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree received. 
 Some high school, no diploma 
 High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: 
GED) 
 Some college credit, no degree 
 Trade/technical/vocational training 
 Associate degree 
 Bachelor's degree 
 Master's degree 
 Professional degree 
 Doctorate degree 
 
QÉDU Quel est le plus haut niveau de formation scolaire que vous 
avez complétée ? 
 J'ai assisté au secondaire, mais je n'ai pas obtenu mon diplôme 
d'études secondaires 
 J'ai obtenu mon diplôme d'études secondaires ou j'ai passé 
l'examen du GED (ou quelque chose d'équivalent) 
 J'ai assisté à l'université, mais je ne détiens pas un diplôme 
universitaire 
 J'ai reçu la formation professionnelle 
 J'ai obtenu un diplôme d'associé en quelque chose 
 J'ai obtenu un baccalauréat 
 J'ai obtenu une maîtrise 
 J'ai obtenu un diplôme professionnel 
 J'ai obtenu un doctorat 
 
QGEN Please specify your gender. 
 Male 
 Female 
 Other 
 
QGEN Veuillez indiquer votre sexe. 
 Masculin 
 Féminin 
 Autre 
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QELE If the Federal election were held today, which party would you 
vote for? 
 Conservative 
 Liberal 
 New Democratic Party 
 Green 
 Other 
 Don't know / Prefer not to say 
 
QÉLE Si les élections fédérales avaient lieu aujourd'hui, quel parti 
politique voteriez-vous ?  
 Parti conservateur du Canada 
 Parti libéral du Canada 
 Nouveau Parti démocratique 
 Le Parti Vert du Canada 
 Autre 
 Je ne sais pas / Je préfère ne pas dire 
 
APPENDIX E.  SURVEY RECRUITMENT EMAIL 
Dear member of the Probit research panel, 
 
We are inviting you to participate in a study about how Canadians view scientific technologies. Your 
responses will help inform research that looks at ways to improve communicating science with citizens. 
 
Please rest assured that this is voluntary and your answers are completely confidential (this means that 
no individual will be associated with the survey's results - rather, all of the results will be combined to 
protect the confidentiality of each respondent). 
 
The researchers at the University of Saskatchewan would like to thank you for your interest in their 
research and your participation. 
 
Probit, Inc. 
 
Madame, Monsieur, 
Nous vous invitons de participer à une étude à propos de comment les Canadiens comprennent la 
technologie scientifique. Vos réponses nous aideront à rechercher de meilleurs procédés de 
communiquer les sciences avec les citoyens 
 
Soyez assuré(e) que ceci n'est pas obligatoire et que vos réponses seront complètement confidentielles 
(c'est-à-dire aucun individu ne sera associé aux résultats du sondage – tous les résultats seront plutôt 
combinés afin de protéger la confidentialité de chaque participant).  
 
Les chercheurs à l'Université de Saskatchewan voudrions vous remercier de leur avoir montré votre 
intérêt pour leur recherche et d'avoir participé à l'étude.  
Veuillez recevoir, Madame, Monsieur, nos salutations distinguées. 
 
Probit, Inc. 
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APPENDIX F.  SURVEY (WAVE 1) 
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Principal Investigator: 
Michael Atkinson 
Professor 
Johnson Shoyoma Graduate School of Public Policy 
University of Saskatchewan 
306-966-8451 
michael.atkinson@usask.ca 
 
Collaborators: 
Tyler Koebel 
Graduate Student 
Johnson Shoyoma Graduate School of Public Policy 
University of Saskatchewan 
403-330-6388 
tyk854@mail.usask.ca 
  
Debriefing Form 
Thanks for taking the time to participate in part 1 of 2 of our study! Research like this depends on participation by 
individuals like yourself. We are very grateful for your help and will contact you again in approximately one week 
for part 2 of our study. 
 
If you have any questions about this study or if you would like to receive a summary of the results when they 
become available, please contact either the principal investigator Michael Atkinson michael.atkinson@usask.ca 306-
966-8451 or collaborator Tyler Koebel tyk854@mail.usask.ca 403-330-6388. 
 
We would like to remind you that all information that you have provided is considered confidential, your name will 
not be included or in any other way associated with the data collected in the study.  Furthermore, because the 
interest of this study is in the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be identified 
individually in any way in any written reports of this research.  Electronic data will be stored on secure University of 
Saskatchewan servers and deleted after six years. 
 
This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural 
Research Ethics Board.  Any questions regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee 
through the Research Ethics Office ethics.office@usask.ca 306-966-2975. Out of town participants may call toll free 
888-966-2975. 
 
Please print a copy of this page for your records 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Chercheur principal: 
Michael Atkinson 
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École supérieure de politique publique Johnson Shoyoma 
Université de Saskatchewan 
306 966-8451 
michael.atkinson@usask.ca  
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Tyler Koebel 
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Rapport de suivi 
Merci d'avoir participé à la première de deux parties de notre étude! La recherche comme celle-ci dépend de la 
participation des individus comme vous. Nous sommes reconnaissants d'avoir reçu votre aide. Nous vous 
contacterons encore une semaine d'aujourd'hui pour la deuxième partie de notre étude.  
  
Si vous avez des questions concernant cette étude ou si vous voudriez recevoir un résumé des résultats quand ils 
deviennent disponibles, veuillez contacter le chercheur principal Michael Atkinson michael.atkinson@usask.ca 306 
966-8451 ou le collaborateur Tyler Koebel tyk854@mail.usask.ca 403 330-6388.  
  
Nous voudrions vous rappeler que toute l'information que vous nous avez fournie est considérée confidentielle. 
Votre prénom ne sera pas associé à la collection finale des données de cette étude. De plus, vous ne serez pas 
identifié(e) dans les rapports imprimés de cette étude puisque l'objectif de notre recherche est de découvrir les 
réponses moyennes de tous les participants. Les données électroniques seront enregistrées sur les serveurs protégés 
de l'Université de Saskatchewan et elles seront toutes supprimées dans six ans. 
  
Ce projet de recherche a été approuvé par le Conseil d'éthique de la recherche comportementale de l'Université de 
Saskatchewan. Si vous avez des questions de vos droits comme un participant de cette étude, vous pouvez contacter 
le Conseil par le Bureau d'éthique de la recherche ethics.office@usask.ca 306 966-2975. Si vous êtes à l'extérieur de 
la ville, vous pouvez appeler ce numéro sans frais 888 966-2975. Si vous avez des questions de cette étude, vous 
pouvez contacter le chercheur principal Michael Atkinson michael.atkinson@usask.ca 306-966-8451 ou le 
collaborateur Tyler Koebel tyk854@mail.usask.ca 403 330-6388. 
  
Veuillez imprimer une copie de cette page pour vos dossiers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
